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Competitive markets respond automatically to change. Corrective forces are delivered by 
the pricing mechanism, where price changes indicate new allocations in the consumption of 
economic resources. Those market participants that are unable to respond adequately to 
change fail, resulting in a restructuring of the marketplace. Such failures are necessary in 
order to prevent a misallocation of scarce resources. 
Public policies, by attempting to suppress or eliminate the dynamic corrective processes of 
competitive markets, may lead to significant distortions in the marketplace. Using the 
collapse of the American Savings and Loan Industry as a case study, this paper analyses the 
distortions that may arise in the provision of financial services as a consequence of misguided 
public policy. 
While it is recognised that there may be scope for some public sector involvement in the 
financial sector of an economy, the overriding theme is that the goal of financial stability 
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Investor protection schemes, and, more specifically, policies of deposit insurance, have 
traditionally been justified in terms of informational asymmetries. Small investors, it is 
argued, not only lack the resources to assimilate the information necessary for rational 
decision-making with regard to investment choice, but also, given such information, lack the 
sophistication to make a sound interpretation thereof. The problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that such small, informationally-disadvantaged investors are frequently characterised by 
undiversified portfolios, and are consequently unable to absorb material losses to the value 
of their investments. 
Deposit insurance has been further rationalised by those who maintain that exposing these 
investors to the possibility of material losses will substantially destabilise the financial 
services sector of an economy, disrupt the payments mechanism, and adversely affect the 
aggregate macroeconomy. The alleged reasons are as follows: certain investors, upon 
witnessing material losses suffered by others (as a result of, for instance, the insolvency of 
a particular financial institution), may, in an effort to secure the value of their own 
investments, react by withdrawing their funds from their respective institutions, regardless 
of the financial condition of those institutions. The resultant abnormal aggregate withdrawals 
may create a liquidity crisis which, if it is of sufficient magnitude, may degenerate into a 
solvency crisis as institutions attempt to liquidate assets at short notice. The deeper the 
solvency crisis, the heavier the losses suffered by investors, and the more severe the impact 
on the economy as a whole. 
Deposit insurance, then, is seen by its proponents as a panacea, which, by securing the value 
of investors' funds, eliminates both the problem of informational asymmetries, and the 
danger of irrational "bank runs". 
This paper, inspired by the spectacular collapse of the American Savings and Loan Industry 
during the 1980s, adopts a very different stance with respect to deposit insurance, and 
investor protection schemes generally. The traditional justifications behind deposit insurance 
are criticised on the grounds that the potential for instability in the financial services sector 
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can be significantly reduced by the efficient operation of a lender of last resort, while 
unsophisticated investors can be afforded a "safe haven" without the all-encompassing cover 
of deposit insurance. 
Deposit insurance is not, however, merely seen as being unnecessary. It is argued that, as 
per any insurance contract, by insulating investors from any risk of loss, deposit insurance 
erodes market discipline, creates perverse risk-shifting incentives for insured financial 
institutions, and exposes the deposit insurer to the insurance market problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. When this deposit insurer is an agency of the state (as has 
been the custom worldwide), further problems arise, thus increasing the potential dangers of 
deposit insurance schemes. These include both agency problems, where the interests of 
bureaucrats do not coincide with the interests of the public they represent, and problems of 
"regulatory capture", where regulators actively pursue the interests of focused minority 
groups at the expense of the interests of the majority. Ultimately, investor protection 
schemes, by tampering with the dynamic corrective processes of competitive markets, may 
result in both technical and allocative inefficiencies, with adverse consequences not only for 
the financial services sector, but also for the economy as a whole. 
This investigation into investor protection schemes was further motivated by the rapid 
changes being experienced by the financial services sector in South Africa. Technological 
advances, particularly in the fields of telecommunications and computing, are redefining the 
nature of the industry, while the Mutual Banks Bill, tabled in the South African Parliament 
in June 1993, gives rise to the prospect of increased competition in the provision of financial 
services, and paves the way to a new banking structure similar to the Savings and Loan 
Industry in the United States. 
These changes, as well as the increased availability of financial services to black South 
Africans, unschooled in personal financial management, will, no doubt, lead to calls for 
increased regulation of financial institutions. The losses suffered by investors as a result of 
recent financial scandals (the most notable of which being the 1992 Masterbond debacle), 
2 
strengthens the case for investor protection. The Melamet Report1, presented to the Deputy 
Minister of Finance in March 1993, which advocates a "holistic" approach to financial 
services regulation, can be seen as a step in this direction. 
The paper is structured as follows: Chapter One reviews the general theory of insurance and 
analyses in detail the case for state-sponsored deposit insurance. In the second chapter, a 
model of risk-shifting by the owners of financial institutions is constructed, and certain 
predictions are made as to the possible dangers of the moral hazard, adverse selection and 
agency problems that arise when the obligations of financial institutions are guaranteed by 
the state. Chapter Three is a case study of the collapse of the American Savings and Loan 
Industry, providing empirical support for the predictions generated in Chapter Two. The 
fourth chapter considers various techniques, common to all insurance markets, that may be 
used to resolve the perverse incentives inherent in state-sponsored deposit insurance schemes. 
The emphasis is on a revitalisation of market discipline as an alternative to further reliance 
on the regulatory apparatus. Finally, in the appendix to Chapter Four, a contemporary 
model of private self-insurance for financial institutions is presented. The main findings of 
the paper are then summarised in the conclusion. 
1Report of the Committee of Inquiry Into the Feasibility of a Holistic Approach for Financial Supervision 
of Financial Institutions, Financial Services and Deposit-Taking Institutions, a report submitted by Justice D.A. 
Melamet to the Deputy Minister of Finance, Johannesburg, 31 March, 1993. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE THEORY OF 
INSURANCE 
1.1 TIIE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 
1.1.1 Uncertainty and Risk 
Economic agents rarely, if ever, operate within the confines of certainty. For most, the 
outcomes of everyday decision making are "risky" or probabilistic. In many cases, the 
probability of a particular outcome may be known objectively. One can be certain that, in 
a coin-tossing experiment with an unbiased coin, the probability of the outcome being 
"heads" at each toss of the coin, is 50 percent. The decision to call "heads", however, is 
still risky, but the exposure to risk is known. Sometimes, the probability of any outcome 
may not be objectively known. When one places a bet on a particular horse, one cannot 
know with certainty the probability of that horse being a winner. Under such circumstances, 
individuals will form a subjective probability based on all the relevant information at their 
disposal. 
1.1.2 The Expected Utility Hypothesis 
Consider an economic agent faced with the following decision: a certain gift of R2 million, 
or a gamble based on the outcome of a coin toss. If the outcome is "heads", the agent 
receives R4 million, yet if it is "tails", the agent receives nothing. The expected value of 
the gamble, defined as the weighted average of the payoffs of the possible outcomes, is equal 
to the certain value of the gift, namely R2 million. This is calculated as follows: 
R2 million= (50%) R4 million+ (50%) RO 
Empirically, however, one would find that most economic agents would not be indifferent 
between the certain gift of R2 million and the gamble described - in most cases, a decision 
would be made in favour of the certain gift. An agent's reservation price, (i.e., the value 
of the certain gift that would leave the agent indifferent between it and the risky gamble), 
will typically be substantially less than R2 million. 
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The formal explanation for this phenomenon of avoiding gambles was first offered by a 
contemporary of Adam Smith, Swiss mathematician and cleric Daniel Bernoulli (Cooter and 
Ulen 1988). His insight was to resolve the paradox that reservation prices are not necessarily 
equal to expected payoffs by postulating that economic agents, when faced with risky 
decisions, do not attempt to maximise expected monetary values, but rather expected utility. 
The introduction of utility paved the way for a model of decisionmakers' attitudes tow~ds 
risk. 
1.1.3 Risk Aversion 
Bernoulli hypothesised that the common relationship between money or wealth (W) and 
utility (U) was such that as wealth increased, utility increased, but at a decreasing rate. In 
terms of differential calculus, this can be expressed as follows: U' (W) > 0 and U" (W) < 0. 
For example, if one's wealth stands at Rl 000, an additional Rl 000 will add more to total 
utility than it would if one's wealth stood at RlO 000. An individual whose utility function 
in wealth exhibits such diminishing marginal utility may be termed "risk averse". Following 
Bernoulli, economists are generally agreed that the attitude of most economic agents towards 
risk is one of aversion, although it is recognised that there may be exceptional cases of risk 
neutrality or risk preference. 
A more meaningful definition of risk aversion is as follows: an individual is deemed to be 
risk averse when the utility of a certain prospect of wealth is higher than the expected utility 
of an uncertain prospect of equal expected monetary value. This may be demonstrated using 
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FIGURE 1-1 
The Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth 
U(W) is the utility function of a risk-averse individual, such that u' (W) > 0 and U" (W) < 0. 
Assume that the individual has a current level of wealth WO and is presented with the 
following choice: a gift of amount WA, or a risky prospect with possible outcomes WL and 
W8 with probabilities PL and P8 respectively, where PL =P8 =1h. Further assume that the 
expected monetary value of each option is the same i.e. WA =PLWL +P8 W8 . Graphically, 
this is represented by distance EF = FG. 
If the individual elects to take the certain gift, the associated utility is represented by distance 
BF. In order to identify the expected utility of the risky prospect, the line AC is constructed, 
representing the weighted average of the utilities of the possible outcomes, i.e. 
PLU(W0 +WJ+P8 U(W0 +W8 ). Since EF=FG, the expected utility of the risky prospect 
is equal to distance DF. Clearly, the utility of the certain prospect (U(W0 + W ~), or distance 
BF, is greater than the expected utility of the risky prospect, distance DF. The logic behind 
this result is that the marginal utility of the potential return to risk taking (Wlf"W ~ is only 
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the amount CI, which is insufficient to compensate for the potential loss in utility from 
forsaking an equal monetary amount (WA-WJ, or distance BH. 
The individual's reservation price is given by WR, since a certain prospect of WR yields the 
same utility as the risky prospect (i.e. JK=DF). Equivalently, the vertical distance from A 
to J is equal to the vertical distance from J to C. Since WR<PLWL +P8 W 8 , this indicates 
that a risk-averse individual will be willing to pay some premium in order to avoid risk. 
This behavioural implication of risk aversion forms the basis of the market for iosurance. 
1.2 THE MARKET FOR INSURANCE 
A risk-averse individual may attempt to convert an uncertain outcome into a certain one in 
a number of ways. Firstly, when considering the purchase of a risky asset, the individual 
may only be prepared to offer a price lower than the expected monetary value of the asset. 
Secondly, the individual may self-insure, which might involve incurring expenses in order 
to minimise the probability of the occurrence of an uncertain event and the extent of 
monetary and other loss upon its occurrence. The final method the risk-averse individual 
might adopt is the purchase of insurance from another party, discussed below. 
1.2,1 The Demand for Insurance 
Suppose this risk-averse individual faces a potential loss, L, with a probability, Pi, against 
which he wishes to insure. Assume the individual has initial wealth, W0 • In the absence of 
insurance, the expected wealth of the individual is W0 -PiL (see Figure 2-2, overleaf), 
yielding expected utility of DF. The individual would be indifferent between this expected 
wealth and the certainty equivalent, WR (since DF=HI). It follows that the individual would 
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Risk Aversion and the Demand for Insurance 
1.2,2 The Supply of Insurance 
Wealth (W) 
A common fallacy exists that suppliers of insurance, due to their mirror-like relationship with 
those demanding insurance, must be risk seekers. This fallacy is resolved by the 
mathematical theorem known as the law of large numbers, which holds that what may seem 
random or probabilistic to the individual becomes deterministic and predictable among large 
groups of individuals. The larger the number of policies an insurance company sells, the 
more dependable are its probability calculations and the less is the risk to which it is 
exposed. In the extreme, the attitudes of insurance companies towards risk are not of 
material interest. 
The insurance premium charged by a competitive insurance company to the afore-mentioned 
individual would therefore be PiL+T, where T covers the insurance company's transactions 
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costs and normal profits. Provided this premium is less than IG (or, equivalently T<IF), 
both parties will expect to benefit and there is scope for a viable insurance contract. 
Ll INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN INSURANCE 
"Economic theorists traditionally banish discussions of information to footnotes. 
Serious consideration of costs of communica~on, imperfect knowledge ....... would, 
it is believed, complicate without informing ....... [f]his comforting myth is false. 
Some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not robust to 
considerations of imperfect information. " 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, p. 629) 
Analysis of the economics of information reveals potential problems for the insurer. The 
existence and efficiency of insurance markets depends on the expected loss, PiL, fulfilling 
certain conditions. Thus far it has been assumed, albeit implicitly, that individuals can 
communicate information regarding their expected loss at negligible cost and/or that there 
is no scope for misrepresentation of this information as insurers are able to, and incur no 
costs in, establishing it for themselves. 
It has been further assumed that the ex-ante (i.e., before the insurance contract is signed) and 
ex-post (i.e., after the insurance contract is signed) values of PiL, the expected loss, are the 
same or that any change in either Pi or L can be costlessly monitored by the insurer, 
resulting in a renegotiation of the original contract. By dropping these restrictive 
assumptions the impact of informational asymmetries on insurance markets can be analysed. 
Specifically, the following questions will be answered: 
What would happen if the costs to insurers of gathering information regarding 
individuals' expected losses, by means of monitoring their behaviour, were 
prohibitively high? 
What would happen if individuals were unable to communicate reliable information 
regarding their expected losses, without incurring excessive costs? 
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In order to do this, two problems pervasive in all insurance markets, namely moral hazard 
and adverse selection, will be introduced . 
.LM Moral Hazard 
In the context of insurance, moral hazard may be defined as the actions of economic agents 
in maximising their own utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not 
bear the full costs of their actions as a result of uncertainty and incomplete contracts. The 
incompleteness of contracts may result from informational asymmetries and the costs of 
monitoring and contract enforcement. 
More specifically, moral hazard will arise where the insured individual can influence the 
expected loss, PiL (either by influencing the value of Pi or L, or both), at a cost lower than 
the expected gain, and do so without the insurer's knowledge. 
As but one example, consider the purchase by an insured individual of preventative measures 
which will reduce the probability and/or cost upon occurrence of the insured event (e.g. fire 
extinguishers, smoke detectors, burglar alarms etc .... ). From a social perspective, the 
efficient level of expenditure on preventative measures is where the marginal cost of such 
expenditure is equal to the marginal benefit in the form of a reduction in the expected loss, 
PiL. 
Where the loss is fully insured, however, and the insurer is unable to monitor the reduction 
in the expected loss with any degree of accuracy, any expenditure on preventative measures 
by the individual will only result in a negligible reduction in the insurance premium, defined 
PiL+T. To the extent that such expenditure results in lower total claims against the insurer, 
the beneficiaries will be all insured individuals, rather than only those individuals responsible 
for the reduction in total claims. The result is that individuals face private incentives to 
underinvest in preventative activities. The problem of moral hazard thus results in 
inefficiency from a social perspective due to excessive purchase of insurance cover. 
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1.3.2 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is an insurance market version of the "Lemons Principle" developed by 
George Akerlof (Akerlof 1970). It arises from the inability of insurers to distinguish between 
high-risk and low-risk applicants for insurance, and/or the inability of those applicants to 
furnish credible evidence regarding their risk status. Where the insurance company cannot 
distinguish high-risk from low-risk individuals, it must charge a premium based on average 
risk, namely 
+T 
where n is the total number of individuals buying insurance. 
Low-risk individuals pay more than they would otherwise have in the absence of 
informational asymmetries, while high-risk individuals pay less. The resultant premiums are 
therefore inefficient in the sense that a cross-subsidisation takes place between low-risk and 
high-risk individuals. The implication is that certain low-risk individuals may elect not to 
insure, thus raising the average risk of those insured and consequently the insurance 
premium, inducing further low-risk individuals to abandon ideas of insurance. The result is 
an insurance market where only those most likely to suffer the loss seek the benefits of 
insurance. In the extreme case there may exist markets in which no insurance is available. 
This possibility can be demonstrated by means of a simple example. 
Assume that the set of n individuals seeking insurance is indexed by a risk parameter, Pi 
(where i=l ton), distributed uniformly between O and 1. A value Pi=O indicates that the 
individual has no chance of suffering the loss insured, while a value Pi= 1 indicates certain 
loss. Further assume that, in the event of a loss being suffered by any of the insured, that 
loss will always be identical, of amount L. Due to informational asymmetry, the insurer can 
only observe the average risk of those insured, P (equal to 1h), while individuals can 
determine the exact probability of their suffering the loss concerned. 
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Clearly, the average claim expected by the insurance company is PL=L/2. Assuming that 
the insurer wishes to earn a return of 20 percent, the insurance premium will be 3 / 5 L. Since 
those individuals purchasing insurance are assumed to be risk averse, one may surmise that 
insurance will be a worthwhile prospect for all individuals whose known probability of loss, 
Pi~ 1h 1• Therefore, those purchasing insurance will be indexed by risk parameter, Pi, 
distributed uniformly between 1h and 1. This will give rise to a new value for P ( = * ). The 
resultant average claim expected by the insurance company will be * L, inducing a revision 
of the premium. The new premium will be 9/ 10 L, effectively excluding all but the most 
risky from the insurance market. A continuation of the analysis may preclude the existence 
of the insurance market altogether. 
Thus, in the presence of adverse selection, insurance markets are inefficient and may even 
fail entirely. One possible solution that has been suggested in order to deal with the problem 
of adverse selection is to make insurance compulsory for all, thus preventing low-risk 
individuals from leaving a pooling equilibrium. However, the negative side-effects of such 
a policy may be substantial, in that it may encourage low-risk individuals to incur more risk 
in order to reap the full benefits of the premiums they are paying. 
LU Techniques Adopted by Private Insurers to Counter Moral Hazard and Adverse 
Selection 
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are essentially problems of information. If the 
insurer were somehow able to (i) determine the true risk status of individuals seeking 
insurance cover, and (ii) accurately and costlessly monitor any behavioural change after the 
purchase of insurance, then the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard would 
disappear. In the absence of such abilities, the insurer must rely on more conventional 
methods to reduce the extent and effect of informational asymmetries. 
1As 1h < 3/s, this is consistent with risk aversion. In fact, the example is equally applicable for all Pi>O. 
Where Pi=O such individuals would have no incentive to purchase insurance. 
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Attempts to reduce the extent of informational asymmetries must rely on monitoring, which 
is not costless. An insurer will only monitor the behaviour of those purchasing insurance 
when the marginal benefit of such monitoring (in the form of reduced claims and/or more 
accurate premiums) exceeds its marginal cost. In many cases, the costs of monitoring with 
any degree of accuracy are prohibitively high. Where monitoring is impractical, the insurer 
must attempt ·to limit the effect of informational asymmetries by reducing the incentives of 
insured individuals to take advantage of such asymmetries. 
In order to bring the interests of insured individuals more in line with those of the insurer, 
that insurer must attempt to internalise the externalities associated with the behaviour of those 
individuals. This would decrease the divergence between the marginal social benefit (cost) 
of their behaviour, and its marginal private benefit (cost). Such an objective could be 
achieved by means of a 'tax' on behaviour that results in increased expected insurance 
claims, while behaviour that results in lower expected claims could be subsidised. 
The techniques adopted by private insurers to achieve these goals may be classified as 
follows: monitoring; risk-related premiums; deductibles and coinsurance; exclusion of 
benefits and cancellation provisions. 
(i) Monitoring 
The more information an insurance company can gather about an insured individual, the 
closer will be its estimate of PiL to the actual value. Monitoring the behaviour of insured 
individuals is thus of clear value to the insurer in setting premiums. The insurer can also 
attempt to reduce the adverse selection bias by developing better methods of discriminating 
among those seeking insurance, such as medical testing for life insurance, so as to create 
more accurate risk classes. 
(ii) Risk-related premiums 
In setting premiums that are related to risk, the insurer is attempting to internalise the 
externalities associated with the ex-post behaviour of the insured individual. When insured 
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individuals engage in behaviour that increases the risk of the insured loss, their premiums 
will be raised. Conversely, behaviour that is expected to reduce the risk of the insured loss 
will be rewarded in the form of lower premiums. Examples are higher life insurance 
premiums for smokers, and lower fire insurance premiums for those who install fire 
extinguishers. Monitoring difficulties dictate that individuals will never face the full cost 
(reap the full benefit) of their actions in the form of higher (lower) premiums; yet risk-based 
premiums should go some way toward curbing the problem of moral hazard. 
(iii) Deductibles and Coinsurance 
Deductibles and coinsurance may be used to reinforce risk-related premiums in combating 
moral hazard. Under a deductible plan, individuals shoulder a fixed monetary amount of the 
loss (the so-called 'excess'), while under coinsurance, individuals shoulder a fixed percentage 
of the loss. Both methods are intended to minimise moral hazard by giving individuals the 
incentive to reduce the probability of the loss. 
To continue an earlier example, individuals will incur expenditure on preventative measures 
up to the point where the marginal cost of such expenditure is equal to the marginal benefit 
to the individual, in the form of a lower probability of incurring the deductible, or a lower 
expected value of the coinsurance payment. Clearly, individuals may still underinvest in 
preventative measures, but to a lesser extent than before. Deductibles and coinsurance may 
also help to minimise the adverse selection problem. These devices are far less attractive to 
high-risk individuals, so that insured individuals' willingness to accept such provisions may 
act as a clear signal to the insurer as to their risk status. 
(iv) Exclusion of benefits and Cancellation provisions 
Insurers may protect themselves from extreme cases of adverse selection and moral hazard 
by means of the exclusion of benefits or cancellation provisions. For instance, individuals 
may be excluded from the benefits of insurance when losses arise from pre-existing 
conditions (life insurance policies sometimes contain a clause excluding cover during the first 
year of the policy). In addition, insurance may be cancelled if it is established that the loss 
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was deliberately incurred (fire insurance losses are not payable in the event that the insured 
individual committed arson). 
1.4 AN INTRODUCTION TO DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
1.4.1 General 
Under a system of deposit insurance, certain of the liabilities of a financial institution (usually 
the smaller deposits of so-called 'unsophisticated' depositors) are, in the event of the 
insolvency and closure of that institution, insured against any losses incurred as a result of 
an excess in the value of those liabilities over the market value of the assets of that 
institution. Holders of such liabilities are reimbursed out of a deposit insurance fund, which 
is periodically supplemented by means of insurance premiums levied against insured financial 
institutions by the deposit insurer. 
1.4.2 The Justification for Deposit Insurance 
The most frequently quoted reason for the existence of a system of deposit insurance is the 
danger of contagious bank runs by ill-informed depositors (in the absence of deposit 
insurance) leading to defaults on the payments system and possible adverse effects for the 
macroeconomy as a whole. In addition, it has been suggested that deposit insurance will 
improve the informational efficiency of the financial sector of an economy. Finally, deposit 
insurance has been justified in terms of the need to protect the savings and transactions 
balances of small, informationally disadvantaged depositors. It is worthwhile to consider 
each of these arguments in more detail. 
(i) Bank runs 
While non-financial firms can be pressured into satisfactory price and product performance 
by the threat of losses and, ultimately, failure, there is a common belief that "banking is 
different", and consequently banks, particularly large ones, cannot be permitted to fail. This 
belief is frequently referred to as the "too large to fail" (TLTF) myth (Kaufman 1990). 
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Proponents of the TL TF doctrine suggest that the failure of a large bank would set off a 
"domino effect" that would drag into insolvency other financially sound banks and perhaps 
even non-financial institutions. Their reasoning is as follows: the failure of a large bank and 
(in the absence of deposit insurance) the consequent losses incurred by its depositors will lead 
to a lack of confidence in the banking system as a whole. Other depositors, acting on poor 
information, will (irrationally) withdraw deposits from their respective banks "to be on the 
safe side". 
The resultant abnormally high deposit outflows will cause aggregate bank reserves to fall. 
Under a system of fractional reserve banking, this loss of reserves will trigger a multiple 
contraction affecting solvent and insolvent institutions alike, and result in a fall in the money 
supply. With all banks simultaneously attempting to meet these abnormal demands for 
currency, many will be forced to attempt to liquidate some of their earning assets, resulting 
in a flood of such assets on the market, "fire-sale" losses, and the increased likelihood that 
the banks' liquidity problems will degenerate into solvency problems. A rational run on an 
individual, insolvent bank will thus snowball into an irrational run on the banking system as 
a whole. This will cause defaults on the payments system, wreaking havoc in non-financial 
sectors and the aggregate macroeconomy. When viewed in such a light, bank failures do 
seem to be uniquely different from the failures of other organisations. Deposit insurance is 
thus justified in that it removes, or at least reduces, the incentives for bank runs and 
consequently stabilises the banking system. 
Such a scenario, however, exaggerates the impact of a run on an insolvent institution for a 
number of reasons. The first, according to Kaufman (1990), is that the flight to currency 
will not be as dramatic as predicted by the proponents of TLTF. Certain banks may be 
perceived to be "safe" by depositors, with the result that they will shift their funds to those 
banks. Other, more sceptical depositors may be unwilling to redeposit directly, rather opting 
to purchase safe, non-bank securities such as government stock - a so-called "flight to 
quality". However, this merely begs the question: what do the sellers of the securities do 
with the proceeds? It is likely ·(since they sold the securities), that these sellers perceive 
certain banks to be safe, and the funds will be indirectly redeposited into the banking system. 
In the case of direct and indirect redeposits, the economic effect of bank runs is minimal -
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reserves and deposits are redistributed within the banking system, but no loss occurs to the 
system as a whole. Certain banks experience liquidity strains, while others experience 
liquidity surpluses - no liquidity crisis occurs in the system as a whole, and there is no 
decline in the money supply. 
Even in the event of a substantial flight to currency, the picture is not nearly as bleak as that 
suggested by the proponents of TLTF. A solvent bank will generally experience little 
difficulty in obtaining sufficient liquidity to meet abnormal deposit outflows. Liquidity can 
be obtained through the sale of liquid assets, such as government stock (if such assets are 
saleable), borrowing from liquid banks (if such banks exist), or the operation of a properly 
functioning lender of last resort. The function of the lender of last resort is to provide the 
market with liquidity in times of pressure by discounting the financial "paper" (bills and 
other related securities), presented to it. The role of the lender of last resort thus must be 
distinguished from that of "bailing out" insolvent institutions. In order to achieve this, the 
lender of last resort must be able to determine which institutions are suffering a genuine 
liquidity crisis, and which are, in fact, insolvent. 
This problem is resolved by the market - the central bank (as lender of last resort), can 
remain ignorant of any single institution. The reason is as follows: the greater the liquidity 
required, the "poorer" the quality of the paper that will be discounted and thus the higher the 
cost of that liquidity (i.e. the rate of interest charged). A poorly-managed institution will be 
carrying poor-quality paper and, in the extreme case, the cost of liquidity will be 
prohibitively high. That institution's inability to continue operation will, then, be of its own 
making. 
Depositors, observing solvent banks' ability to meet abnormal demands for liquidity, will 
regain confidence in the banking system. Provided the lender of last resort performs its 
function properly, the danger of irrational runs on the banking system as a whole will be 
averted. Any runs that do occur will be rational and non-contagious, based on information 
that the institution concerned has ( or is about to) become insolvent. The threat of such runs 
is a strong deterrent to excessive risk taking by banks and is, in fact, more likely to 
strengthen than to weaken the long-run stability of the banking sector. 
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Thus it seems that deposit insurance is unnecessary in protecting the banking system (and 
indeed the entire macroeconomy) from the "perils" of destabilising bank runs. In fact, it is 
arguable that, through its all-encompassing "blanket-cover", deposit insurance reduces the 
threat of rational bank runs and may well have a negative effect on the stability of the 
financial system. In the following chapter, it will even be suggested that deposit insurance, 
if incorrectly · managed, may lead to runs towards "bad" banks. 
There is, however, one important sense in which "banking is different". The misuse of 
resources by financial institutions, which may well result from the absence of any threat of 
a rational bank run, has more severe efficiency consequences than the misuse of resources 
by other non-financial institutions. Financial institutions have the scope not only for 
misusing the resources they employ directly, but also for distorting the use of resources by 
all institutions in the economy. Where, from the point of view of allocative efficiency, it is 
important that an inefficient non-financial institution fail, it is doubly important for a financial 
institution. 
(ii) Jnfonnational Efficiency 
Proponents of a system of deposit insurance argue that it is necessary in order to improve 
the informational efficiency of the financial sector of an economy. Due to economies of 
scale, the information gathering and assimilation costs to a centralised agency are likely to 
be considerably lower than the total of such costs for all depositors. In addition, certain 
smaller, unsophisticated depositors may lack the skill and the resources to monitor effectively 
the condition of their financial institutions. While this may be adequate justification for the 
existence of an information gathering service, it does not explain the need for a deposit 
insurer. 
(iii) Depositor Protection 
The final argument (and that which is most resistant to scrutiny) in favour of deposit 
insurance is that, from a social standpoint, unsophisticated depositors should have a 
dependable sanctuary for their savings and transactions balances. It is generally accepted that 
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these individuals should not be subjected to a rule of caveat depositor and be forced to select 
an institution the asset portfolio of which they approve, and in which they have confidence. 
The reasons are as follows: firstly, such a rule assumes a degree of expertise in financial 
matters lacking in most small depositors. The cost of acquiring such expertise would, in all 
likelihood, be prohibitively high. Secondly, these depositors often have a significant 
proportion of their wealth invested in savings and transactions balances, and lack the 
resources to absorb unpredictable losses. 
It is argued that deposit insurance will solve these problems by securing the value of these 
depositors' inv~stments. As mentioned earlier, however, deposit insurance may also have 
a negative impact on the stability of the financial system by reducing the threat of rational 
bank runs. Clearly, any system of deposit insurance will involve, at least to some extent, 
a trade-off between these two factors. Mechanisms which may be used to attempt to achieve 
an optimum balance will be analysed in Chapter 4. 
~ Deposit Insurance : The Realm of Government 
" ..... only the sovereign enforcement and taxing power of government 
is likely to provide the necessary assurance for most ........ depositors. 11 
(White 1989, p.26) 
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•••••• potential private insurers cannot as reliably claim implicit backing from the 
U.S. Treasury for their explicit and implicit financial obligations. 11 
(Kane 1989, p.34) 
Both in the literature, and in practice, deposit insurance has always been considered to fall 
within the realm of government. The sole justification for the governmental provision of 
deposit insurance is the government's ability to levy tax. 
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While this argument is a tenuous one, for the moment, following convention, it shall be 
assumed that deposit insurance is indeed provided by the government. In the final chapter, 




GOVERNMENT DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
AND THE EROSION OF 
MARKET DISCIPLINE: 
"THE RECIPE FOR DISASTER" 
The diverse interests of the different parties participating in the operation of the modem 
business organisation is widely acknowledged (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980). 
According_ to Coase (1937), firms are viewed as a nexus for a set of contracts between 
various economic agents. Hence, management and other suppliers of productive inputs, as 
well as holders of financial claims (owners and creditors), are seen as stakeholders whose 
claims against the firm are determined by means of either explicit or implicit contractual 
arrangements. 
A characteristic of most large business organisations is the separation of risk-bearing and 
decision-making. Management is responsible for co-ordinating activities and for the 
execution of contracts with suppliers of productive inputs, taking risks in the process, the 
costs of which are borne by the owners and other holders of financial claims. As managers 
seldom hold a significant proportion of the equity of the firm, they rarely reap the full 
benefits of wise decisions, nor bear the full impact of poor ones. Residual profits generally 
accrue to the owners. Thus it becomes apparent that the interests of management and of 
shareholders may not necessarily always coincide (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
A second, and for the purposes of this analysis, more relevant conflict of interest arises from 
the limited liability feature prevalent in modem corporations. Shareholders are not liable for 
any obligations beyond their initial investment in the enterprise. This results in added risk-
taking being consistent with the interest of shareholders, particularly when shareholder equity 
is dissipated. As will become apparent, this may place the interest of shareholders directly 
at odds with the interest of creditors. 
These observations provide the framework for the construction of a model of risk-shifting 
behaviour, which is extremely relevant to the analysis of government-sponsored deposit 
insurance. As per any standard corporate finance text (e.g. Brealey & Myers 1988), it is 
assumed that owners and creditors are fully diversified and seek to maximise the expected 
value of their respective investments in the firm. It is further assumed that managers operate 
in a world in which there is an exogenous level of uncertainty about which they can do 
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nothing. They can, however, make choices between alternative investment projects, which 
affect both the probability of insolvency and the distribution of returns to both owners and 
creditors. 
The behaviour of managers with regard to investment choice will be considered under two 
different assumptions concerning their objective function. In the first case, managers exactly 
reflect the interests of owners in attempting to maximise expected returns. In the second 
case, managers no longer reflect owners' interests, but are instead seen as being overinvested 
in the firm, concerned only with minimising the probability of its liquidation. (Here the 
analysis is simplified by the assumption that bankruptcy leads to liquidation which results in 
the replacement of management.) In light of these assumptions, certain predictions are made 
as to the circumstances under which the investment decisions of management will, or will 
not, coincide with the interest of creditors. 
2.1.1 Managers Mirror the Interest of Owners 
In order to keep the analysis simple and the focus of attention uncluttered, suppose managers 
must choose between two alternative investment opportunities, A and B. These projects have 
distributions fA(..-) and f8 (..-), where ..- is the level of economic profit or loss. Each project 
requires the same initial investment, is financed in the same manner, and has the same mean, 
-;; however, project B is more risky than project A. Risk refers to the probability 
distribution associated with the outcome of the investment options. Project B, having a 
greater variance, can therefore be thought of as having "more weight in its tails", as depicted 
in Figure 2-1 (overleaf). At i', all shareholder equity is dissipated. It is assumed that any 
level of income below i' implies that the firm will default on its loans and be forced to 
liquidate. 
When the interests of managers and owners coincide, the utility function of managers can be 
defined as follows: U = U ( ..-*), where -;• is the mean of all ..-> i'. From the owners' point 
of view, limited liability implies a truncation of the distributions at i'. All levels of ..- < i' 
are perceived by owners as equivalent as they all imply a complete dissipation of equity. 






Invesbnent Choice - Managers ~IDDed 
Perfect Agents of Owners 
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perfect agents of owners, will always select the more risky alternative, in this case project 
B. 
Creditors, however, are liable for the costs of failure. In the event of liquidation, creditors 
are assumed to receive a pro rata share of the market value of the firms assets. Given 
solvency, creditors will be indifferent to the level of profits ( except perhaps to the extent that 
profit levels may influence the probability of future solvency). However, assuming that the 
magnitude of failure determines the liquidation value of the firm's assets, creditors will 
prefer small failures to large ones. Clearly, project A will be preferable to creditors as the 
probability of failure is less, and, in the event of failure, the extent of the losses should be 
less. 
It is apparent, therefore, that managers who act strictly in their shareholders' interests will 
favour risky projects over safe ones, benefitting by undertlking actions that shift risks onto 
creditors. The closer a firm to insolvency, the lower the value of the owners' interests, and 
thus the more pronounced this tendency will become. A situation of "heads we win, tails 
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the creditors lose" may even lead to managers approving risky strategies with negative net 
present values. 
2.1.2 Managers Overinvested in the Firm 
Managers may not view corporate insolvency with the same equanimity as the diversified 
shareholder; this is because managers' investment portfolios are generally not fully 
diversified. Rather, they can be considered as being overinvested in the firm at which they 
are employed. The reasons for this are numerous. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the value of managers' human capital depends on the success or failure of their firm. 
Managers' career prospects may suffer irreparable damage if those managers are labelled as 
the team that piloted a firm into financial crisis. In addition to this loss in the value of their 
human capital, upon liquidation (and the assumed replacement of management), incumbent 
managers will incur, among others, the following costs: lost wages while searching for 
another position; lower wages in the new position (essentially the result of the fall in value 
of their human capital); and lost non-wage benefits of the old position, including executive 
compensation schemes, power, prestige and self-respect. 
Accordingly, it is likely that managers, instead of having a conventional utility function 
defined over the mean and variance of returns, may experience a discontinuous loss in utility 
upon liquidation. As an alternative, a managerial utility function is proposed in which risk 
is the probability of insolvency and liquidation. Managers have an aversion to insolvency 
that is not shared by fully diversified expected-value-maximising shareholders, and as a result 
wish to minimise the probability of its occurrence. Such a formulation of managerial utility 
reconciles two opposing schools of thought on managerial behaviour in the face of 
insolvency: that the threat of insolvency according to some generates caution, and the 
counter-argument that it produces gambling behaviour (Machlup 1967; Brealey and Myers 
1988). 
Specifically, assume that managers must again choose between investment opportunities A 
and B. The probability of the firm's survival can be defined as follows: 
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p : · = J !;( Tt ')d1t 
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where i=A,B. Utility maximisation for managers can be represented as: 
Consider management behaviour in two cases: expected solvency ( r > -i-), and expected 
insolvency ( 1r < -i-). 
The first case is illustrated in Figure 2-2. P! is maximised by choosing the less risky 





Investment Choice Under Expected Solvency 
- Managers ~wned Overinvested in the Finn 
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We can deduce that managers will avoid risky projects when choosing among options that 
are expected to produce positive economic profits. This is in contrast with the second case, 
depicted in Figure 2-3. Clearly the riskier project, project B, will maximise the chance of 





Investment Choice Under Expected Imolvency 
- Managers Assumed Overinvested in the Finn 
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Thus we can see that the same manager may appear either risk-seeking or risk-avoiding. 
Attitude towards risk will depend on whether the manager believes the firm will remain 
solvent. When the options available have positive expected returns, the desire to avoid 
liquidation will help to counteract the tendency toward risk-shifting as a result of limited 
liability, pushing the manager toward lower-variance projects with consequentially lower 
expected costs to creditors. When all alternatives are losing propositions, however, the same 
manager, in a gamble for resurrection, may select the riskiest projects with the highest 
expected costs to creditors. 
28 
In summary, when managers mirror the interests of owners, they will tend to make 
investment decisions that shift risk onto creditors; moreover, this behaviour is intensified as 
the firm approaches insolvency. Yet, the threat of being replaced in the event of insolvency 
may cause managers to moderate this behaviour and thus more closely reflect the interests 
of creditors. Impending insolvency may, however, again result in managers shifting risk 
onto creditors in a desperate attempt to rescue the firm. 
2.2 MARKET DISCIPLINE AND THE CONTROL OF RISK-SHIFTING 
BEHAVIOUR 
Markets play an important role in reconciling the conflicting interests of the various parties 
to a firm. The threat of being voted from power by dissatisfied shareholders or of a 
corporate takeover bid following depressed share prices will induce managers, at least to 
some extent, to reflect the interests of owners and attempt to maximise the expected value 
of their investments in the firm. 
Of more consequence to this analysis are the mechanisms adopted by creditors in order to 
limit the extent of risk-shifting behaviour by management. Private lending agreements reflect 
a realisation on the part of creditors that managers (as agents of the owners), can potentially 
benefit by undertaking actions that shift risk onto the creditors after the loan has been made. 
To the extent that this behaviour can be predicted in advance, creditors can charge a 
premium in the form of a higher rate of interest on the funds that have been loaned. Pricing 
alone, however, cannot deal with the inherent problem of asymmetric information. As a 
result, the extension of credit is frequently accompanied by legally binding covenants limiting 
the actions of the borrowing firm. In addition, such covenants may, inter alia, require 
specific disclosures to be made by the borrower to the lender, and may allow for oversight 
of the borrower's business by the lender. The most extreme means available to creditors in 
order to enforce their interests are legal bankruptcy proceedings. In light of the aggravated 
incentive problems experienced by managers when a firm is insolvent or approaches 
insolvency, creditors typically seek to take control of a firm away from its management at 
the first indication thereof. 
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Finally, the devastating effect that bankruptcy has on the reputation and career prospects of 
managers may well, in certain cases, limit their tendency towards risk-shifting practices. 
~ THE EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
In the absence of deposit insurance, depositors (as creditors of a financial institution), would 
be expected to withdraw their funds upon discovering risky or ill-advised investment 
behaviour on the part of the institution's management. Such a reaction would be analogous 
to a partial liquidation in order to deprive management of control over their assets. 
In the presence of a system of governmental deposit insurance, however, the incentives of 
depositors to exercise any disciplinary measures are eroded. Since the value of their deposits 
is guaranteed, depositors will no longer find monitoring and discipline of the actions of 
managers necessary or worthwhile. Instead, they will have every incentive merely to 
gravitate towards those financial institutions offering the highest returns, regardless of the 
riskiness of their asset portfolios or their probability of default. This absence of discipline 
from depositors may induce managers and owners to play a new risk-shifting game, namely 
"heads we win, tails the governmental deposit insurer loses" (Barth et al. 1991). Again, this 
behaviour will become more pronounced as the financial institution approaches insolvency. 
In order to afford protection to its insurance fund, the deposit insurer must attempt to ensure 
that both owners and managers have a substantial interest in the continued solvency of the 
firm. This can be achieved by making certain that all financial institutions with insured 
deposits remain well capitalised at all times. The greater the net worth of the institution, the 
greater the insulation provided by the owners' resources before any claims are made against 
the insurance fund. In addition, a larger net worth will reduce the incentives towards 
excessive risk taking. Failing that, it is imperative that the deposit insurer act expeditiously 
in the closing down and removal of management from control of an institution at the first 
sign of insolvency. In this way, managers will see insolvency as a potentially ruinous event 
to be avoided wherever possible, while owners will not be granted the opportunity to exercise 
their accelerated risk-shifting tendencies. 
30 
The existence of deposit insurance thus shifts the onus of discipline from depositors to a 
governmental deposit insurer responsible for the supervision, monitoring and possible closure 
of all financial institutions managing insured deposits. The question now begging is: will 
a government body be able (or even have the incentives) to carry out these duties effectively? 
2.4 INCENTIVE PROBLEMS IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
One essential ingredient for the successful provision of deposit insurance is a precommitment 
to the prompt closure of insolvent institutions. In the case of unregulated business 
organisations, this precommitment is manifested in legal bankruptcy proceedings, initiated 
by uninsured creditors and conducted by an independent judiciary. In the presence of deposit 
insurance, the role of creditor is effectively transferred from the depositors to the 
governmental deposit insurer. 
It is very likely, however, for reasons discussed below, that the incentives of a governmental 
deposit insurer may differ substantially from those of uninsured creditors, resulting in a 
deterioration of the precommitment to early closure. In this event, the policies opted for in 
dealing with insolvent financial institutions may be in sharp contrast to the usual restrictions 
on management imposed in the course of legal bankruptcy proceedings for non-financial 
firms. 
In performing its tasks of monitoring, supervising and possibly closing financial institutions, 
a governmental deposit insurance agency will have a certain amount of discretion in the 
setting and interpreting of policy objectives and in its rulemaking. These discretionary 
powers may result in a politicisation of the deposit insurer's decision-making process, 
resulting in an unwillingness on the part of the deposit insurer to adopt a stance that might 
place it in conflict with politically valuable parties (whether they be uninsured creditors, 
managers or owners of insolvent financial institutions). 
Another danger in granting the deposit insurer some degree of discretion is the possibility 
of negative-sum rent-seeking behaviour. Frequently, the decisions of the deposit insurer will 
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have large redistributional consequences causing interested market participants to expend 
significant economic resources in attempting to influence those decisions one way or another. 
Employees of government departments have strong incentives to impress their departmental 
overseers in order to increase the value of their future career prospects. As the closure of 
an insolvent · financial institution may be construed as an embarrassing admission of 
inadequate monitoring and supervision by the deposit insurer officials responsible for that 
organisation, those officials may be tempted to postpone action in the hope that the institution 
may somehow resurrect itself, or that they themselves may be transferred to another position, 
thus escaping responsibility for the insolvency. 
Evidently then, the dual problems of regulatory capture as a result of rent-seeking and the 
politicisation of the decision-making process, and the tendency of government employees to 
conceal any problems that might damage their future prospects, may compromise the ability 
of a governmental deposit insurer to limit risk-taking behaviour. In the long-run, this will 
lead to greater claims being made against the insurance fund, and, in the extreme, may result 
in the bankruptcy of the fund itself. If a significant deficit in the insurance fund were to 
arise, the deposit insurer, in order to fulfil its commitment to insured depositors, would, in 
some way or another, have to impose some costs on taxpayers. Clearly this would be 
politically unpopular, and substantial incentives therefore exist for a governmental deposit 
insurer to adopt stalling techniques as a means of avoiding acknowledgement of this state of 
affairs. One such technique might be a policy of forbearance for insolvent institutions. 
Ultimately, however, this may effect even greater costs for taxpayers. 
~ THE RECIPE FOR DISASTER 
It is thus apparent that, under a system of governmental deposit insurance, excessive risk-
taking on the part of insolvent financial institutions may be tolerated as few incentives exist 
to take the steps necessary to harness it. All elements of market discipline are removed from 
financial markets, with depositors insulated from loss by insurance, while, from the deposit 
insurer's perspective, the decision to let an insolvent institution fail has its roots entrenched 
more in politics than in economics. Forbearance in the event of insolvency may even result 
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in managers viewing that eventuality without trepidation. Risk-shifting will still take place, 
with the risk effectively being borne by taxpayers. 
From the point of view of the owners of a financial institution, deposit insurance can be 
thought of as a put option vis-a-vis the deposit insurer. If the institution deteriorates into 
insolvency, then the owners can place it with the deposit insurer and incur no further costs 
to themselves. According to White (1990), the value of this put option to the owners of the 
financial institution, and the cost of such an option to the deposit insurer (and possibly 
taxpayers), will increase with: 
(i) increases in the variance of returns (risk) of the institution's asset portfolio; 
(ii) decreases in the institution's net worth (the value of the put will reach a maximum 
at the point of zero net worth); 
(iii) decreases in the deposit insurer's willingness to monitor and control excessive risk-
taking by the institution; and 
(iv) decreases in the deposit insurer's willingness to remove managers from control and 
owners from their ownership rights in the event of insolvency. 
When one views deposit insurance in this light, one can easily imagine a situation arising 
where managers of undercapitalised (or even insolvent) financial institutions offer high rates 
of return on deposits which they use to finance high-risk ventures in the hope that, in the 
remote chance that those investments are successful, they may secure (at least temporarily), 
the future of their respective institutions. If, however, the projects fail, consequent losses 
will be borne by the deposit insurer and possibly taxpayers. This, of course, is a typical 
example of the moral hazard problem experienced by private insurance organisations as 
mentioned in the first chapter. 
Depositors, meanwhile, secure in the knowledge that their investment is guaranteed, will 
merely place their funds with that institution which is offering the highest returns. In this 
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way, deposit insurance may well draw customers away from sound financial institutions 
offering lower, but "correct", returns (given the market conditions pertaining at the time), 
towards the more liberal promises of less sound banks. In order to compete, managers of 
these sound financial institutions will themselves be forced into adopting an investment 
strategy of high-risk, high-return. The ultimate result of this will be an overallocation of 
resources info high-risk assets and a proliferation of unsound institutions, increasing the 
expected value of future claims against the insurance fund. Thus a governmental deposit 
insurer will, in much the same way as the private insurer, be subject to the problem of 
adverse selection. 
A system of governmental deposit insurance is thus a potential "recipe for disaster". One 
can easily picture a financial market, where investors are insured by the government, 
deteriorating into a self-perpetuating spiral of regulatory forbearance accompanied by 
excessive risk-taking, culminating in the bankruptcy of the insurance fund and substantial 
losses to taxpayers. This is nowhere more evident than in the collapse of the American 
Savings and Loan Industry, documented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DISASTER MANIFESTED: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 
" ....... as to guaranteeing bank deposits ...... The general underlying thought behind 
the use of the word 'guarantee' with respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee 
bad banks as well as good banks. The minute the Government starts to do that the 
Government runs into a probable loss ....... We do not wish to make the United States 
Government liable for the mistakes and errors of individual banks, and put a premium 
on unsound banking in the future." 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 8, 1933)1 
U THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
In the wake of the failures of thousands of Savings and Loan institutions (S&Ls) over the 
1929-1933 period, the United States Congress for the first time established a comprehensive 
system of regulation and insurance for S&Ls. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 
creating the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB) as their supervisory agency, was passed in order to coordinate the lending of low-
cost funds to S&Ls so as to facilitate their provision of low-cost housing finance. With the 
passage of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, the FHLBB was given extensive chartering 
and regulatory powers over S&Ls. Finally, the year after federal deposit insurance had been 
introduced for commercial banks, the National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), a deposit insurance fund for S&Ls, which 
was placed under the auspices of the FHLBB. 
The FHLBB was empowered to levy an annual flat-rate insurance premium of 1A of one 
percent of total deposits of each insured S&L, with a view to establishing an insurance fund 
equal to five percent of all insured liabilities within 20 years. Deposits were initially insured 
up to a maximum of $5 000 and the FSLIC was expected to accumulate sufficient reserves 
to compensate fully all insured deposits under any foreseeable circumstances. During times 
of stress, a further emergency assessment of 1A of one percent was authorised. 
1The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, Random House, 1938, p.37, cited 
by Ely and Vanderhoff 1991a, p.25. 
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The objective of the United States Government was to use the S&L industry as a means of 
satisfying the need for low-cost housing finance. S&Ls were expected to achieve this by 
making long-term, fixed-rate home mortgage loans, holding them in their portfolios, and 
financing them primarily by means of short-term passbook savings and deposits, insured by 
the FSLIC. 
3.2 PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATIONS OF THE S&L CRISIS 
~ Federal Deposit Insurance Actuarially Unsound 
Within a year of the establishment of the FSLIC, both the flat-rate premium and the 
emergency assessment were halved to 1 I 8 of one percent of total deposits. This action was 
based on the pretext that enhanced regulation would hold the future losses of insured S&Ls 
well below historical averages. Yet, as Barth et al. (1991) point out, there was some 
awareness at the time that the lower rates might cause future funding problems for the 
insurance fund. As early as 1935, Leo T. Crowley, the first chairman of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the commercial bank insurance fund, admitted as much in 
testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency. 
Despite this, over the ensuing years, statutory deposit insurance premiums were cut further, 
as coverage was expanded. In 1950, the FSLIC was granted the right to borrow from the 
U.S. Treasury, while insurance premiums were reduced to 1/ 12 of one percent. In 1966, the 
insurance coverage of S&L deposits was raised to $15 000, and again to $20 000 in 1969, 
$40 000 in 1974 and $100 000 in 1980. 
The rapid postwar growth in deposits, combined with lower premiums, resulted in the 
FSLIC's insurance fund never exceeding two percent of insured deposits, thus falling 
woefully short of the five percent target mandated by the National Housing Act. Clearly, 
the structure of the federal deposit insurance system made the insolvency of the FSLIC at 
best a very real possibility, and at worst inevitable. Yet, as Barth et al. (1991) indicate, the 
question as to what should be done during periods in which abnormal losses swamped the 
insurance fund, remained unanswered. 
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3.2.2 The Dangerous Practice of Maturity Mismatching 
Federal policy after 1933, and particularly the ban on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), 
transformed the nation's S&Ls into highly unsound financial institutions. While the long-
term (20-year or more) fixed-rate mortgage may have been an admirable policy goal, the 
S&L industry, which has historically funded itself by means of short-term deposits, was the 
incorrect candidate. The practice of borrowing short to lend long exposed S&Ls, in times 
of rising short-term interest rates, to an increasing cost of funds with no corresponding 
increase in income. An actuarially sound deposit insurance system would have penalised the 
adoption of such interest rate risk by charging higher insurance premiums, thereby forcing 
institutions to match more closely the maturities of their assets and liabilities. In the absence 
of ARMs, fixed-rate mortgage loans would have been held by life insurance companies, 
pension funds and other long-term components of the capital market. 
3.2.3 Regulation Q 
Stable interest rates largely concealed the maturity mismatching practices within the S&L 
industry until the mid-1960s. However, in 1966 an interest rate spike exposed the inherent 
dangers: S&Ls found the interest costs on their short-term deposits rising, while the income 
from their portfolios of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages (made years previously at lower 
rates) remained unchanged. 
The reaction of Congress was unfortunate. Instead of lifting the ban on ARMs, Congress, 
in September 1966, enacted the Interest Rate Control Act, extending Regulation Q to S&Ls. 
Regulation Q, which placed a regulatory interest rate ceiling on deposits, had previously 
applied only to commercial banks. (fo limit the alternatives available to depositors, and thus 
reinforce this regulatory stopgap, the Treasury Department increased the minimum 
denomination of Treasury bills from $1 000 to $10 000.) 
Had Regulation Q's interest rate controls not been extended to S&Ls, the inherently unsound 
financial structure of the S&L industry would have become an economic and political issue 
by the mid-1970s, as short-term interest rates continued to rise. Effectively, Regulation Q 
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perpetuated the operation of an unsound S&L industry, substantially increasing the cost of 
resolving the maturity mismatching problem. 
J..,J THE 1979 - 1981 INTEREST RA TE EXPWSION 
Disaster struck the S&L industry when, in October 1979, Paul Volcker, then chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board, in response to rising oil prices and inflationary expectations, 
overnight became a monetarist. The devastating effect of the consequent surge in interest 
rates on the market value of fixed-rate mortgages owned by S&Ls was, for a while, largely 
neutralised by the willingness of many depositors to maintain deposits at S&Ls at below-
market interest rates. In the first half of 1981, for instance, S&L depositors were, on 
average, accepting yields almost five percent below market rates (Ely 1990). By late 1981, 
however, regulatory ceilings on deposit interest rates could no longer solve the interest rate 
problems being suffered by S&Ls, since depositors were now faced with an attractive 
alternative - money market mutual funds. The fundamental flaw in the design of the savings 
and loan industry was finally and unequivocally exposed. 
Crippled by sharply higher funding costs, at least 85 percent of all S&Ls lost money in 1981, 
the aggregate net operating loss for the industry being $7.1 billion. The slide continued into 
1982 as short-term interest rates remained high and aggregate net operating losses almost 
topped $9 billion (Barth et al. 1991). The effect on the capital of the S&L industry was 
more dramatic still. Tangible capital (at historical cost) declined to 0,6 percent of assets in 
1982 from 3,9 percent in 1981, while on a market value basis, the capital-to-asset ratio was 
actually negative, as the Chairman of the FHLBB, Richard Pratt, later acknowledged: 
"By 1982, the real capital positions of all [S&L] institutions had been completely 
eroded, and virtually all [S&L] institutions had large negative net worths when their 
assets and liabilities were valued at actual market rates." 
(Richard T. Pratt, Chairman of the FHLBB, August 3, 1988)2 
1'estimony Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, August 3, 1988, 
cited by Barth et al. (1991), p.26. 
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In fact, according to Ely and Vanderhoff (1991a), by mid-1982 the market value of FSLIC-
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As interest rates began to decline again, reaching a four and one-half year low by mid-1983, 
the market value of mortgages held by S&Ls climbed as their cost of funds fell, and many 
S&Ls were restored to solvency on a market value basis. However, the 1979 - 1981 interest 
rate spike had permanently crippled a large number of S&Ls, particularly those which had 
sold their mortgages at a loss when interest rates were at their peak (encouraged, perversely, 
by FHLBB-authorised liberal accounting policies, discussed below). The cost to the FSLIC 
in 1983 of disposing of these institutions would, according to Ely (1990), have been 
approximately $25 billion (see Figure 3-1), an amount equal to ten percent of their total 
liabilities. 
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Industry officials, however, reticent to make the FSLIC's insolvency explicit and admit to 
the need for a taxpayer bailout (for exactly the reasons discussed in Chapter Two), preferred 
to gamble on the S&L industry's self-resurrection. In the words of Edward Kane: 
"For more than a decade, federal officials refused to acknowledge that the [S&L 
crisisJ had compromised the integrity of the supporting deposit insurance fund. 
Instead of promptly shoring up the finances of this fund, officials used accounting 
smoke and mirrors to cover up the fund's secularly increasing capital shortage. This 
prolonged refusal to face up to the magnitude of the underfunding imposed enormous 
costs on society as a whole." 
(Kane 1989, p.31) 
M THE BUNGLED DEREGULATION OF THE S&L INDUSTRY 
The first attempts to deregulate the S&L industry were contained in the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980. As well as phasing 
out Regulation Q and raising the maximum size of an insured deposit to $100 000, DID MCA 
authorised federally chartered S&Ls to make other types of consumer loans, commercial real 
estate loans, commercial loans and even some direct equity investments (White 1990). 
Lending and investment authority was expanded further by the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, 
the motivation behind these moves being to allow S&Ls to diversify their asset portfolios and 
thus reduce their dependence on mortgage lending. Although the FHLBB had by this time 
authorised ARMs, this authorisation was not retroactive, with the result that many S&Ls 
were stuck with embedded losses in their existing portfolios. Congress was hoping that 
wider asset powers would enable insolvent S&Ls to generate sufficient earnings to offset the 
losses incurred in funding low interest rate mortgages with high cost deposits, and restore 
themselves to solvency, thus averting the need for any taxpayer bailout. 
Many observers have claimed that the above-mentioned moves toward deregulation were 
largely responsible for the extent of the S&L crisis. While this may be true, it is not for the 
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reasons generally cited. DIDMCA and the Garn-St Germain Act did not rescind justifiable 
regulation, but rather removed restrictions that should never have existed in the first instance. 
Unfortunately their timing was poor - initiating deregulation during an interest rate crisis 
almost guaranteed that deregulation would fail, since, according to Ely and Vanderhoff 
(1991a), Congress could not instantly eradicate the "regulatory rot" that had been growing 
in S&Ls for years. 
A successful deregulation of the S&L industry would have required a comprehensive 
restructuring of the federal deposit insurance system. Flat-rate deposit insurance could not 
accommodate in an actuarially sound manner the increased diversity and risk-taking 
opportunities afforded S&Ls by deregulation. Thus the entire burden of curtailing risk and 
imposing discipline, in an environment where thousands of institutions were reporting large 
losses and experiencing severe capital depletion, fell upon the federal insurer. This task 
could only have been achieved through strict maintenance of capital standards and the 
immediate closure of insolvent institutions. Unfortunately, the FHLBB lacked both the 
incentives and the funding to impose sufficient discipline and effectively curtail risk. 
J.tS POLICIES OF FORBEARANCE 
Beginning in 1980, the FHLBB started to sweep aside the problems of the S&L industry. 
Capital standards were debased in a shortsighted and dangerous attempt to hide the true size 
of the S&L industry's problems. This was achieved in two ways: (i) accounting gimmicks 
were adopted to liberalise what could be counted as capital; and (ii) the required capital-to-
asset ratio for S&Ls was reduced. 
During 1981 and 1982, Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) were adopted by the 
FHLBB (often at Congress's behest) for calculating capital for S&Ls. Being considerably 
more liberal than Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), RAP allowed S&Ls to 
record inflated net worth values in order to present an appearance of solvency. One of the 
most harmful aspects of RAP was to allow S&Ls to write off the loss on sale of a fixed-rate 
mortgage over its contractual life, rather than immediately recognising the loss. Effectively, 
this allowed S&Ls to record their deferred losses as an asset (Ely and Vanderhoff 1991a). 
42 
Other policies of forbearance pursued under RAP included management consignment 
programs, consent agreements, net worth and income capital certificates (merely loans from 
the insolvent FSLIC to boost the capital of capital deficient S&Ls), phoenix institutions and 
supervisory goodwill. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed 
analysis of these policies, it is sufficient to say that each was aimed at lowering the number 
of official "problem" institutions facing an already swamped FHLBB. 
Capital standards were further debased by reducing minimum net worth standards from five 
percent of fixed liabilities to four percent in November 1980 (DIDMCA), and again to three 
percent in January 1982 (Garn-St Germain). In addition, capital phase-in rules based 
standards on a five-year moving average of liabilities, and permitted S&Ls that had not been 
insured by the FSLIC for twenty years to operate with a lower net worth ratio based upon 
the fraction of twenty years for which they had been insured. Rapid growth in assets, 
therefore, especially by de novo institutions, required minimal net worth (White 1990). 
M AN EXPWSIVE MIX OF INGREDIENTS 
According to White (1990), by the beginning of 1982, an explosive mix of ingredients was 
in place: 
(i) Deregulation had afforded S&Ls expanded opportunities for risk-taking by entering 
into unfamiliar product lines. 
(ii) After Regulation Q was phased out, S&Ls had expanded opportunities to fund that 
risk-taking. S&Ls with little or no brand-name reputation could attract insured 
deposits by offering (guaranteed) returns in excess of market rates. The increased 
deposit insurance limit of $100 000, authorised by DIDMCA, merely reduced the 
transactions costs incurred by depositors in placing their deposits. 
(iii) S&Ls had expanded incentives for risk-taking. Although many institutions, with the 
help of liberal accounting practices, maintained a facade of solvency, in truth, almost 
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all S&Ls were either insolvent at market-value, or their capitalisation was very thin 
indeed. The corporate-finance theory of the previous chapter predicts that these firms 
would be attracted disproportionately to a flow of positively skewed, negative net 
present value deals in a desperate gamble for a return to solvency. The absence of 
capital and the flat-rate structure of deposit insurance premiums would serve only to 
exacerbate the moral hazard problems of risk-shifting by S&L owners and managers 
alike. 
Overwhelming empirical support for these theoretical predictions can be found in the growth 
spurt of the S&L industry in 1983 and 1984 (Table 3-1, overleaf). The industry's asset 
growth during those two years was almost three times the rate of the previous two years, as 
undercapitalised or insolvent institutions took full advantage of expanded asset powers. 
S&Ls in Texas and California grew particularly rapidly, with the American Diversified 
Savings Bank of California topping the list with an average annual growth rate of assets 
(1983-1985) of 346.3 % (Barth et al. 1991). 
The full impact of the high-risk investment strategies adopted by many S&Ls during this 
period became apparent in 1988 as the FSLIC's accumulated losses due to asset quality 
problems began to escalate dramatically (see Figure 3-1, p 40). 
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TABLE3-1 
Annual S&L Growth Rates 
(as measured by ~), 1981-1988 
Year U.S. Total Texas1 California1 
1981 7,8% 9,7% 8,2% 
1982 7,3 13,2 18,3 
1983 18,6 33,3 28,0 
1984 19,9 38,0 29,6 
1985 9,5 18,4 8,8 
1986 8,7 5,5 13,1 
1987 7,5 2,8 12,0 
1988 8,0 11,4 14,1 
1 Asset growth in California and Texas was even greater than the national average due to the more liberal 
charters available in these states. 
~: White (1990) 
~ INACTION IN THE FACE OF RISING RFSOLUTION COSTS 
Even in the absence of an actuarially sound system of deposit insurance, the S&L crisis could 
not have attained its staggering proportions without regulatory connivance and, in particular, 
the unwillingness on the part of Congress to admit to the insolvency of the FSLIC (and the 
consequent need for financial assistance from taxpayers). 
Evidence of the lackadaisical approach of the regulatory authorities during the early 1980s 
can be found in the regulatory resources employed at that time. Between 1981 and 1985, 
the examination and supervision staff employed by the FHLBB actually declined from 1385 
to 1337, while the examination and supervision budget increased only marginally (White 
1990). In further support of allegations of regulatory inactivity is the history of FHLBB 
resolutions, documented in Table 3-2 (overleaf). The 205 insolvent institutions resolved in 
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1988, at a then-estimated present-value cost of almost $32 billion, had, on average, reported 
no tangible capital since 1984 or 1985. When one considers that tangible capital figures are 
still based on the historical cost of assets, on the basis of market value, these institutions had 
become insolvent even before then. Yet with a federal guarantee, they had managed to 
continue to attract deposits, taking excessive risks at, ultimately, the taxpayers' expense. 
TABLE3-2 
S&L Resolutions, 1980 - 1988 
Estimated Present 
Total ~ts of Value Resolution Average Number of 
Number of Resolutions Cost Months of Tangible 
Year Resolutions1 ($ Millions) ($ Millions) Insolvency 
1980 11 $ 1 458 $ 167 5 
1981 28 15 908 759 5 
1982 63 17 662 806 8 
1983 36 4 631 275 16 
1984 22 5 080 743 23 
1985 31 6 366 1 026 26 
1986 46 12 455 3 065 31 
1987 47 10 660 3 704 35 
1988 205 101 242 31 790 42 
1Resolutions refer to all institutions either closed (and liquidated), or recapitalised by the FSLIC. Resolution 
data for 1988 do not include 18 "stabilisations• with an estimated present-value resolution cost of $6 838 
million. 
~: Barth et al. (1991) 
Although the FSLIC was probably insolvent as early as 1982, Congress, unwilling to shore 
up the finances of this fund due to short-term political considerations, overstated the value 
of the fund. According to Kane (1989), by making the insurance fund's losses and capital 
deficit implicit rather than explicit, Congress increased the long-run costs of refinancing the 
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FSLIC in two principal ways. Firstly, insolvent S&Ls, by gathering insured deposits at 
above-market rates in order to fund their losses, were effectively creating a more expensive 
form of national debt than if direct Treasury debt had been used. Considering the 
borrowings of insolvent S&Ls post-1983 averaged between $300 and $350 billion, the 
capitalised value of this premium would be considerable. Secondly, understating the FSLIC's 
cumulative shortage reduced public and political pressure to make timely corrections to the 
longstanding structural problems of the deposit insurance system. The extent of the dishonesty 
in quantifying the FSLIC's problems can be seen in the FHLBB's official estimates of the 
FSLIC's reserve position, which were approved by the General Accounting Office, Congress' 
investigative arm (see Table 3-3, below). 
TABLE3-3 
Comparison of Official Estimates of the FSLIC Reserve 
Position with Conservative Estimates of the FSLIC's Imbedded 
Loss in GAAP-Insolvent Finns, 1982 - 1987 (in $ billions) 
Official Estimates 









1982 $ 6,3 $ 67,8 4,55% $ 3,1 
1983 6,4 83,9 5,93 5,0 
1984 5,6 115,5 14,62 16,9 
1985 4,6 138,0 16,04 22,1 
1986 - 6,3 137,2 24,61 33,8 
1987 - 13,7 200,1 34,74 69,5 
1Imbedded losses are calculated by multiplying the assets in GAAP-insolvent firms by the FSLIC's estimated 
resolution-cost rate. 
Sm!m.: Kane (1989) 
Even when one considers only the resolution costs of unresolved GAAP-insolvencies 
(according to historical cost), it is clear that the true value of the FSLIC's net reserves has 
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been smaller than FHLBB estimates, and that the degree of mismeasurement escalated after 
1984. 
By 1986, the financial problems of the FSLIC had become too large to hide. Private 
investors were becoming increasingly concerned as to the creditworthiness of the insurance 
fund's promises and financial guarantees. Yet the Reagan Administration's Recapitalisation 
Plan, unveiled in March of 1986, reflected a continuation of governmental "not-on-my-
watch" mentality that had proven so costly in the past. The express goal of the plan was to 
keep the costs of recapitalising the FSLIC off the government budget. The recapitalisation 
of the FSLIC was further delayed by substantial resistance from the U.S. League of Savings 
Institutions, the lobbying arm of the S&L industry. Regulatory forbearance had become a 
politically popular policy, and rent-seeking behaviour by financially troubled institutions 
continued throughout 1986, while the FSLIC's imbedded losses kept climbing. 
Finally, in August of 1987, Congress passed the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), 
falsely claimed to have recapitalised the FSLIC. The CEBA created a financing subsidiary 
for the FSLIC called the Financing Corporation (FICO), authorised to issue $10,8 billion in 
bonds. Clearly this amount was insufficient to recapitalise the FSLIC, and the CEBA can 
be more accurately described as a "reliquification" plan (Kane 1989). 
The creation of FICO was, predictably, an elaborate attempt to keep the initial costs of 
bailing out the FSLIC from appearing in the explicit national debt, the reason being that the 
Treasury does not explicitly stand behind FICO. As a result, as Kane (1989) points out, 
FICO has had to pay about 70 to 110 basis points over the yield on comparable Treasury 
securities in order to compensate for default risk and liquidity differences. Kane (1989) has 
calculated the cost of not acknowledging Treasury responsibility for FICO bonds at 
approximately $100 million per annum. 
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M FIRREA 
The CEBA clearly cannot have been intended to be anything more than a temporary measure. 
In 1989, the incoming Bush Administration faced, as one of its main priorities, the 
recapitalisation of the FSLIC. The result, the most recent legislation attempting to provide 
a lasting solution to the problems of the S&L industry, was the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), enacted in August of that year. 
The FIRREA dissolved both the FSLIC and FHLBB in an attempt to separate the functions 
of industry regulator and administrator of the insurance fund. As Dotsey and Kuprianov 
(1990) point out, the FHLBB had both the incentive and the means to hide the true condition 
of the FSLIC. They were replaced by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), responsible 
for the regulation, examination and supervision of all S&L institutions, and an independent 
insurance fund, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), administered by the FDIC. 
The Act also restricted investment powers, requiring greater specialisation in mortgage 
lending, and called for the phasing out of policies of capital forbearance. Flat-rate insurance 
premiums were increased in order to raise funds for the newly-founded SAIF, and for the 
first time the necessity for direct government funding was acknowledged (although the 
amount raised again proved hopelessly inadequate (White 1992)). Again, an off-budget 
financing subsidiary was used to raise further funds, unnecessarily and deceitfully increasing 
the ultimate burden for taxpayers. 
Although the FIRREA substantially enhanced the "safety and soundness" regulation of the 
S&L industry, it failed to address the fundamental cause of the debacle, the very structure 
of the deposit insurance system. The continued assessment of flat-rate premiums means that, 
even today, deposit insurance remains actuarially unsound, while the degree of discretionary 
judgement still afforded government regulators fails to preclude the reoccurrence of similar 
problems. According to Kane (1989): 
"By continuing to treat such issues as 'what is capital' or 'when should an institution 
be recapitalised or closed' as matters of governmental discretion, the plan allows 
Congress the opportunity to offer to intervene in the disciplinary activity of regulators 
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as a 'constituent service' for owners and managers of troubled institutions ..... . " 
(Kane 1989, p.44) 
3.9 THE COSTS OF PUBLIC POLICY FAILURE 
According to recent estimates, the cost to well-capitalised, soundly-managed financial 
institutions and other taxpayers of failed public policy in dealing with the S&L industry, is 
in excess of $200 billion (White 1992). This figure continues to grow at approximately $800 
million per month, as the 101 st Congress, adjourned in 1991, remains unwilling to provide 
the additional funding necessary to expedite the cleanup (Ely and Vanderhoff 1991a). 
In addition to these direct costs are inestimable billions of dollars in indirect costs, resulting 
from distortions in real estate markets and from an inefficient and partially obsolete S&L 
industry. From the point of view of allocative efficiency, the overlending of the early 1980s, 
as well as the tendency towards negative net-present-value projects, has left the Unites States 
with a pool of ill-conceived (and frequently unsaleable) commercial and residential real estate 
developments. The recent regulatory crack-down on real estate overlending has further 
depressed real estate markets and aggravated the problem. 
The very existence of the S&L industry is at risk as surviving institutions, by means of 
higher flat-rate premiums, are being forced to cross-subsidise the costs that failed S&Ls have 
inflicted on the economy. Government officials, responding to the embarrassments of the 
past, have tightened the regulatory noose which binds S&Ls, thereby increasing their 
operating costs and stifling their ability to respond promptly to the changing needs of a 
technology-driven marketplace. Ultimately and inevitably, this has resulted in a lower 
standard of financial services being provided at a higher cost. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESOLVING INCENTIVE PROBLEMS 
IN DEPOSIT INSURANCE: 
A RETURN TO THE MARKET 
4.1 REGULATORY REFORM 
As observed in the previous chapter, the collapse of the American Savings and Loan industry 
was the result of the following factors : 
(i) the unsound funding structure of S&Ls, perpetuated through Regulation Q; 
(ii) excessive risk-taking by undercapitalised financial institutions using insured 
deposits; 
(iii) the aggravation of this moral hazard problem by a system of flat-rate deposit 
insurance premiums; 
(iv) the complete absence of market discipline to control risk-taking, due to the 
extensive "blanket-cover" provided by deposit insurance; and 
(v) the incentive problems of government regulators and their unwillingness to 
take prompt action in closing insolvent institutions. 
The extent of the burden that must be borne by American taxpayers provides emphatic 
illustration of the serious flaws in such a financial regulatory system. Its primary 
shortcoming was that it ignored, and in many cases attempted to override, market forces. 
Two paths are open to financial reform. The first involves further utilisation of the 
regulatory apparatus; the second relies on a reinvigoration of the principles of the market to 
provide the necessary incentives to guide the industry. 
It is not disputed that a political and legal structure is necessary in order to assure individual 
property rights and provide a framework of rules within which markets operate. But the 
dangers of using detailed regulation to guard against the normal risks of a competitive 
marketplace are self-evident in the collapse of the Savings and Loan industry. Regulation 
has proven ineffective and very costly in attempting to secure the safety and soundness of the 
American financial sector. Further regulation, particularly in an industry experiencing such 
rapid technological change, is not, then, the solution. 
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Consequently, in this chapter, a broad spectrum of possible reform proposals to the system 
of deposit insurance as implemented by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC) will be considered. Such considerations are, of course, of equal relevance, mutatis 
mutandis, to other systems of deposit insurance, and indeed investor protection schemes 
generally . . The suggestions for reform share a common theme: each one, to a greater or 
lesser extent; attempts to create incentives for private individuals (whether shareholders, 
creditors, depositors or even private insurers), to assist or replace government regulators in 
monitoring and constraining risk-taking by financial institutions. The logic behind such 
suggestions is that the task of monitoring will be performed more efficiently and effectively 
by private individuals facing a credible risk of loss. 
In order to provide some structure to the analysis, the reform proposals are divided into three 
categories. Such categorisation does not imply that the various proposals are necessarily 
mutually exclusive, however, and in many cases optimum results may be achieved using a 
combination of reforms. The first to be considered are those which retain the government 
as the sole provider of deposit insurance; secondly, those reform proposals that invoke the 
use of private insurers in assisting the government in the provision of deposit insurance will 
be discussed; finally, the necessity for any governmental involvement in deposit insurance 
will be questioned. In the appendix to this chapter, a viable model of private, self-insurance 
by financial institutions is presented. 
It is useful to reiterate that deposit insurance is merely another form of insurance. It can be 
likened to third-party automobile liability insurance, where the insurer promises to 
compensate beneficiaries (depositors; motorists and pedestrians) in the event that the parties 
carrying the insurance (financial institutions; drivers) cause them harm (by not redeeming 
deposits; causing them injuries). The identities of the insured and the beneficiary are 
different, yet the insured is expected to exercise caution with respect to the insured event. 
The reform proposals presented in this chapter draw extensively from the techniques adopted 
by a typical insurance company to protect itself against excessive risk exposure, mentioned 
briefly in Chapter 1. 
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They are: 
(i) Assimilate information on the expected risk of insured parties. 
(ii) Make use of deductibles. 
(iii) Price insurance premiums according to the expected value of insurance. 
(iv) · Limit the amount of insurance offered. 
(v) Cancel insurance, if justified. 
(vi) Practice coinsurance. 
(vii) Spread risk by reinsurance. 
~ REFORM INITIATIVES UNDER GOVERNMENT DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
4.2,1 Information 
One of the most important reforms to deposit insurance, and one upon which almost all other 
reform proposals rely, is the assimilation of market value accounting information. In the 
absence of such information, deposit insurers will remain woefully ignorant as to the true net 
worth and true risk of insured financial institutions. This is most apparent in the event of 
an insolvency, when the ultimate cost to the deposit insurer is determined by the market 
value of assets less that of liabilities - historical cost (or book value) accounting figures are 
effectively irrelevant. 
Substantial improvements in risk assessment could be achieved by the deposit insurer by 
requiring that all assets, liabilities and off-balance-sheet commitments of an institution be 
marked to market value periodically. In this manner, any changes in the solvency position 
of an insured institution as a result of changes in the creditworthiness of debtors or major 
movements in interest rates would be promptly reflected. If regulators were to use such 
market values as the standard for determining insolvency, it would substantially reduce the 
extent of potential claims on the deposit insurance fund. 
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Mark-to-market accounting would also have other advantages. Capital standards could be 
used to far greater effect and monitored more accurately; in addition, the improvements in 
risk assessment would facilitate the setting of risk-based premiums (discussed below). Under 
a system of historical cost accounting, an institution required to increase its net worth will 
be tempted to divest itself of its highest quality assets first to realise gains over book value, 
while leaving.poor quality loans on its books, since their book value exceeds realisable value. 
A system of market value accounting would already have recognised such gains and losses, 
thus eliminating such perverse incentives. 
Finally, market value information has advantages grounded in the political economy. It is 
abundantly clear, both in theory and in the events leading to the collapse of the Savings and 
Loan industry, that government regulators are necessarily too slow in closing insolvent 
institutions, resulting in higher costs for taxpayers. Market value accounting, by making 
insolvencies more transparent, will limit the scope for regulatory contrivance in masking the 
true earnings and net worth positions of insured institutions. Consequently, this form of risk-
taking at the expense of the public will become more difficult (White 1989). 
The primary argument levelled against the use of market value information is that such 
information is unavailable or would require approximations. Clearly this is not the case for 
all financial assets. Many of the securities held in financial institutions' asset portfolios are 
actively traded and secondary markets exist for certain types of loans. Other high quality 
loans of short maturity or with adjustable rates could be considered to approximate market 
value, as interest rate risk and default risk are sufficiently small. Problems arise in 
determining the market value of loans for which no secondary markets exist, such as 
consumer loans and loans to small business. The technology-driven trend towards 
"securitisation" (the packaging of a diversity of loans into actively traded securities), and the 
increase in loan trading amongst institutions, indicates that techniques are being developed 
in the private sector to value almost all financial assets. 
Without doubt, market value accounting will involve some degree of approximation, but the 
apparent precision of historical cost accounting is a charade. Market value information may 
not be a perfect indicator of risk, but it will represent a substantial improvement. 
55 
4.2.2 Deductibles I Risk-based Capital 
The capital or net worth of an insured financial institution can be thought of as a deductible 
in an insurance policy. It is the first line of defence in the protection of depositors (the 
second and third being the insurance fund and taxpayers respectively). The logic behind risk-
based capital requirements is that the riskier the activities undertaken by an insured 
institution, the greater the expected value of the insurance option, and thus the greater should 
be the cost of acquiring that insurance due to the costs of raising additional equity. As such, 
risk-based capital represents an implicit form of pricing and attempts to force owners of 
financial institutions to internalise the external costs of excessive risk-taking. Cast in a 
different light, risk-based capital requirements could be likened to a system of coinsurance, 
where the "shareholder-insurer", together with the government deposit insurer, guarantees 
the losses of the insured financial institution. The greater the expected losses of that 
institution (due to excessive risk-taking), the greater the expected claims against the 
"shareholder-insurer", who, for obvious reasons, has a natural advantage in controlling such 
risk-taking. In this way, the moral ha7.ard problems that might otherwise arise with separate 
shareholders and insurers, are significantly reduced. 
The practicalities of a system of risk-based capital are more complex. The central question 
is: how does one evaluate risk in order to charge the correct (implicit) price for risk-taking? 
Wherever the pricing mechanism is imperfect, allocational inefficiencies will occur in the 
form of too much (or too little) risk being taken. The success of any such system requires 
that the risk weights assigned to the various assets in the portfolio of a financial institution 
reflect the actual risk of those assets. The existence of high risk assets receiving lower risk 
weights will result in financial institutions choosing those asset risk levels with the most 
advantageous insurance-pricing characteristics. 
In the late 1980s, after meetings in Basel, Switzerland, bank regulators of twelve industrial 
nations agreed upon a standard of capital requirements for commercial banks. These "Basel 
capital standards" were officially introduced to the United States in 1992. According to the 
standards, banks are required to hold $4 of equity capital for every $100 of "risk-weighted" 
assets. Essentially, risk-weighted assets are calculated by giving full weight to business 
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loans, but only a 50 percent weight to home mortgages and no weight at all to Treasury 
bonds. 
The Basel standards have been criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, the crude asset 
classification system will, in all likelihood, encourage intra-class substitutions toward riskier 
assets. Secorid, the standards ignore interest rate risk incurred by holding mismatched assets 
(e.g. long-term mortgages funded with short-term deposits). This has been the justification 
for the maintenance of a minimum "leverage capital requirement" for American banks as a 
supplement to the Basel standards. Third, the standards fail to consider an elementary 
principle of finance, namely that the riskiness of a portfolio is a function of the covariances 
of the returns of the assets in that portfolio, not merely the average riskiness of the assets it 
contains. Finally, there are fears that any governmental asset classification system may lead, 
to some degree, to the politicisation of the credit allocation decision of financial institutions. 
These criticisms are valid, but insufficient, to condemn a system of risk-based capital for 
financial institutions. The concurrent use of market value accounting techniques would go 
a long way towards solving the problems of interest rate risk and developing more accurate 
categories of asset classification. Risk-based capital is by no means a panacea, but the 
response to its critics is the same as that to the critics of market value accounting: it may 
not be perfect, but it represents an improvement over its alternative, uniform net worth 
requirements. It seems preferable to permit a deposit insurer to attempt to measure risk and 
act accordingly, rather than to ignore it. 
A variant of the risk-based capital proposal, which again may be likened to a system of 
coinsurance, involves the use of subordinated debt. The deposit insurer could require that 
some proportion of an insured institution's required net worth be in the form of long-term 
subordinated debt, held by parties other than the institution's owners. This would provide 
further insulation for the insurance fund, as the interests of the debt holders would be 
subordinated to those of the deposit insurer. Since the holders of such debt would not share 
in the up-side gain of risk-taking by the institution's management/owners, but would be the 
first to experience down-side losses upon the dissipation of owners' equity, there would exist 
substantial incentives for them to assist the deposit insurer in its attempts to control risk-
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taking. The returns required by these uninsured creditors and the market value of such debt 
if it were publicly traded, would provide useful information to the deposit insurer regarding 
the risk-status of the institution concerned. Subordinated debt could also be used to reconcile 
the conflicting interests of owners and creditors (and/or uninsured depositors). By requiring 
that the ow_ners of financial institutions hold a certain amount of subordinated debt, regulators 
could, at least to some extent, nullify the risk-shifting incentives arising from limited 
liability, particularly when insolvency is imminent. 
4.2.3 Risk-based Premiums 
Risk-based premiums are similar to risk-based capital in that they, too, attempt to force the 
owners of financial institutions to internalise the external costs of excessive risk-taking. They 
differ, however, in that they represent an attempt to price such risk explicity. To the same 
extent that uninsured creditors require higher returns when they are exposed to greater risk, 
the deposit insurer should charge higher premiums where insured deposits are used to finance 
more risky ventures. Following the notation of the first chapter, the deposit insurer should 
attempt to set premiums equal to the expected value of the insured loss, PiL. 
Clearly such a system is far superior to the practice of flat-rate deposit insurance premiums, 
still being used by regulators of the Savings and Loan industry. Flat-rate premiums explicitly 
subsidise risk with the result that the risk-takers of the industry benefit at the expense of their 
more risk-averse competitors. The across-the-board rate hikes that are currently being 
implemented in order to recapitalise the insurance fund are aggravating this cross-
subsidisation at the expense of soundly managed institutions. Insurance premiums are being 
used as a revenue-generating device to correct for the sunk-cost mistakes of the past (White 
1989). 
In order to be effective, risk-based premiums must be set according to leading measures of 
financial risk, thus forcing owners of financial institutions to include the cost of deposit 
insurance in their cost of funds calculation (Ely and Vanderhoff 1991a). Again one must ask 
the question: what factors should be considered in evaluating risk? Evidently the capital 
adequacy of a particular institution will have a significant effect on the probability of that 
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institution's failure, Pi, and the loss to the insurance fund in the event of failure, L. Risk-
based premiums could therefore provide an important supplement to risk-based capital 
requirements by correcting the capital market's imperfect pricing of risk. Financial 
institutions would have the opportunity to vary their net worth and portfolio risk at an 
(estimated) actuarially appropriate relative price. Those institutions with the "most 
promising" risky portfolio opportunities and those with the lowest cost of capital would be 
given the chance to exploit these advantages. 
Other factors to consider in evaluating risk (apart from capital adequacy and asset quality) 
might include internal controls and management skills, earnings, liquidity, interest rate risk 
and asset diversification. Again, market value information would be of considerable use. 
Since deposit insurance can be thought of as a put option in the hands of an institution's 
owners, where the stock of that institution is traded in active markets, options pricing 
techniques could be used to price insurance premiums. 
Critics of risk-based premiums are again quick to point out the dangers of mispricing risk, 
and again deserve the same response: risk-based premiums will, like any insurance 
premium, misprice risk to some extent. But at least some attempt is then being made to 
price risk. 
4.2.4 Limiting the Amount of Insurance 
The reform initiatives considered thus far have (with the exception of the subordinated debt 
variation of risk-based capital), attempted to increase the market discipline imposed on 
shareholders of financial institutions by the shareholders themselves. The means of achieving 
this has been to narrow the gap between the costs and benefits of risk-taking behaviour. 
Other proposals suggest that there might be some advantage to be gained from exposing 
certain depositors (and creditors) to a credible threat of loss in the event of bank failure. The 
threat of loss would encourage these depositors and creditors to assist regulators in 
monitoring the health of their institutions, resulting in a more timely identification and 
correction of problems. The owners of financial institutions would find their ability to take 
risks constrained by the withdrawal of funds in the event that their behaviour was deemed 
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to be "too risky". Market discipline would be enhanced by the threat of a rational bank run, 
while a properly functioning lender of last resort would prevent contagion. 
Three specific proposals exist to increase depositor discipline, namely decreasing the deposit 
insurance limit per account, limiting the amount of deposit insurance per individual, and 
practising soine degree of coinsurance between depositors and the government deposit 
insurer. 
Deposit insurance was initially intended to provide a safe investment vehicle for small, 
unsophisticated depositors. The current deposit insurance limit in the United States of $100 
000 is believed by many to be unnecessarily high for this purpose, especially in light of the 
increasing availability of information regarding the condition of financial institutions. Cargill 
and Mayer (1992) suggest a lowering of this deposit insurance limit in order to induce larger, 
more sophisticated depositors to pay attention to the financial condition of their institutions. 
Such a reduction would, however, in all likelihood, be futile. Individuals with deposits 
greater than the new limit would merely spread their funds over a larger number of 
institutions, the only inconvenience being an increase in transactions costs. Attempting to 
limit the amount of deposit insurance per individual is similarly doomed · by the 
impracticability of enforcement. 
Under the coinsurance proposal, depositors might be required to absorb some predetermined 
share of an institution's insolvency loss, or receive a modified payout consisting of their 
funds less some pro-rata deduction to reflect expected losses. Such a prospect would provide 
a very real incentive for depositors to exercise control over the owners of financial 
institutions. 
Unsophisticated depositors who feel themselves incapable of monitoring the condition of 
financial institutions could ensure the safety of their funds by investing in "risk-free" assets 
such as government securities. A variation on this theme, the so-called "narrow banking" 
concept, has been proposed by Robert Litan (Litan, 1987). 
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4.2.S The Narrow Bank and Tailor-Made Banking 
Essentially, the narrow bank proposal requires that any institution offering liabilities in the 
form of government-insured deposits invest only in highly marketable and essentially riskless 
assets such as government securities. These "narrow banks" would amount to money market 
mutual funds · in short-term, safe assets, although they would be likely to offer more in the 
way of depositor conveniences. Other financial services, including commercial, consumer 
and mortgage lending would be conducted by financial institutions offering liabilities 
explicitly uninsured by government. Such an institution could be a separate subsidiary of a 
holding company that also owns a narrow bank, or alternatively, could be an independent 
entity or part of another commercial, industrial or financial organisation. 
The narrow banking concept achieves many of the objectives of deposit insurance reform. 
Firstly, it provides a safe haven for unsophisticated depositors. Secondly, to the extent that 
the danger of contagious runs on insured depositories is real, that danger is eliminated by the 
liquidity of bank assets. Thirdly, it eliminates credit risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk 
for insured deposits, and solves the problems of market value information and risk-based 
capital and premiums for the government deposit insurer. Consequently, it protects taxpayers 
from loss. Fourthly, taxpayers are further insulated from losses incurred by owners of 
uninsured liabilities in institutions operating beyond the realm of the narrow bank. These 
individuals would be required to monitor the condition of their respective institutions and 
exercise discipline where necessary, driven by the threat of material loss. Finally, if 
sufficient "narrow assets" were available, deposit insurance would become redundant, except 
in cases of outright fraud and theft. Hence the dangers that arise from the incentive 
problems of government regulators would all but disappear as the need for, and discretion 
of, these regulators diminished. 
The main criticism levelled against narrow banking is that it would impede the banking 
synergies becoming increasingly feasible due to technological advance. The economies of 
scope among financial institutions' lending and deposit-gathering activities would be largely 
lost by separating these activities into two different types of institution. Another objection 
is that there may exist depositors who wish to earn a higher return than the yield on short-
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term, safe assets, but who do not wish to expose their entire deposit to the risk of loss. One 
might argue that such depositors could allocate their funds between a narrow bank and 
another financial institution according to their preference. A more efficient means of 
achieving this allocation, and one that would maintain the economies of scope in the 
provision of financial services, is a proposal that may be called "tailor-made banking". 
The tailor-made banldng concept 
Under a system of tailor-made banking, financial institutions could offer various classes of 
deposits, each with different levels of insurance. Depositors with a low degree of 
sophistication could place their funds in a "narrow account", against which the financial 
institution would have to maintain full, short-term, safe asset backing. Those depositors 
wishing to earn a higher return could then invest in other classes of deposits, trading off 
insurance coverage for higher returns. Depending on the class of deposit (and hence the 
level of insurance), financial institutions would be granted differing degrees of freedom with 
respect to their choice of asset portfolio. The degree of freedom would clearly vary 
inversely with the level of insurance, enabling those institutions to invest lower insurance 
deposits in higher return assets. 
This sytem has the advantage of explicitly indicating to depositors that any return in excess 
of the risk-free rate less transactions costs is associated with some risk of loss. Depositors 
could choose the class of deposit "tailor-made" to suit them, depending on their perceived 
degree of sophistication and access to market information, and their attitude toward risk. 
Unsophisticated depositors would still have access to a safe haven, if they so desire, but the 
dual functions of deposit-taking and other lending activities would still be housed within a 
single institution, thus retaining financial synergies. Given the obvious incentives that exist 
for an institution to invest in the riskiest assets in each category laid down by the government 
insurers (although this behaviour will now be monitored by depositors facing a real threat of 
loss), the gathering of market value information and the implementation of policies of risk-
based capital and premiums would be useful regulatory supplements to the tailor-made 
banking proposal. Capital standards and insurance premiums would be determined after 
taking into consideration factors such as the weightings of deposit classes in an institution's 
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liability portfolio, the assessed risk of the institution's asset portfolio at market value, and, 
in the case of the insurance premium, the current net worth of the institution. 
While the regulatory burden is significantly greater than for a narrow bank, it is not 
substantially different from the existing responsibility of government regulators. The choice 
offered to depositors as to the degree of risk to which they are voluntarily prepared to expose 
themselves offers considerable advantages over the current system of deposit insurance. 
4,2.6 Cancelling the Insurance 
Not one of the above-mentioned attempts to enhance market discipline will have any 
significant effect on the behaviour of shareholders, creditors and depositors unless they are 
strictly enforced by regulators. Noncompliance with the regulatory reforms must be met 
unequivocally with the suspension of insurance coverage and reorganisation of the institution, 
or, in the case of book value insolvency, cancellation of any further deposit insurance 
through closure of the insolvent institution. Deposit insurance limits must be stringently 
adhered to, and creditors of financial institutions must be convinced that they will carry a 
portion of any loss in the event of insolvency. Only if regulators perform their function 
effectively will the market exercise some degree of control over risk-taking behaviour. 
Clearly, the regulatory ideology of "too large to fail" {TLTF) must be abandoned, since 
TLTF eviscerates the entire concept of market discipline. By implicitly guaranteeing that all 
depositors (insured and uninsured alike), and, frequently, all creditors as well, will suffer no 
loss in the event of the insolvency of their respective institutions, TLTF effectively destroys 
any incentives to monitor the financial condition of those institutions. The threat of 
contagious bank runs is exaggerated, and TLTF should be dispensed with on the grounds that 
it is "too costly to continue" (Kaufman 1990). 
In addition to the abandonment of TLTF, a precommitment to the prompt closure of all 
financial institutions upon market-value insolvency must be developed. As discussed in the 
second chapter, this precommitment has been lacking in government regulators as neither 
their jobs nor their wealth are placed at risk if they fail to act expeditiously. Indeed, 
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considerable incentives exist to delay action. The problem is compounded by the fact that 
decisions to close institutions are not made in a vacuum (Kuprianov and Mengle 1989). The 
political process is biased against any form of punitive action, since those who have the most 
to lose in the event of punitive action also have the most to gain from rent-seeking initiatives 
to stave off such action. 
The logical response to these problems is to limit the discretion of government regulators in 
exercising forbearance. By placing legal limits on the discretion of regulators in dealing with 
financial institutions, the government deposit insurer could lend credence to its policy 
regarding insolvencies. By its very design, the legal system is more immune to political 
pressures than are government regulators (Dotsey and Kuprianov 1990). Insolvent financial 
institutions could be treated in much the same way as are unregulated commercial firms 
during legal bankruptcy proceedings. 
An explicit policy statement by the deposit insurer to the effect that an institution will be 
closed and liquidated or reorganised as soon as net worth at book value falls below some 
minimum level (usually zero), and that all creditors and uninsured depositors will be subject 
to a pro rata share of any loss in the event that true net worth is negative, will ensure that 
failing institutions are forced into legal insolvency proceedings in a timely manner. 
Enhanced judicial oversight and increased reliance on the legal system will increase the 
likelihood of the strict enforcement of reform proposals. 
A major stumbling block both to the abandonment of TLTF and the limitation of the 
discretion of regulators in exercising forbearance is political resistance to changes in the 
status quo. Regulators will as vigorously oppose any attempts to curtail their discretion, as 
will financial institutions, particularly the large and the poorly-managed, oppose policies of 
early closure. The problem of political opposition to change could be overcome, at least to 
some extent, by the introduction of private sector insurers to assist the government in the 
provision of deposit insurance. 
64 
~ INVOKING PRIVATE SECTOR INSURERS 
"For a deposit-insurance fund, such policies [of forbearance] reduce the immediate 
political costs of resolving client insolvencies, but they raise the long-run economic 
costs of recapitalising the assets these firms hold. Authorities buy time, but they use 
that time to let the problem fester and worsen ...... . .. In designing and carrying out 
policies for insolvency resolution, the touchstone should be to negotiate and to 
enforce for the taxpayer the same kinds of covenant provisions that a prudent private 
guarantor would require." 
(Kane 1989, p.46) 
The benefits of allocating a portion of the total deposit insurance liability to a private insurer 
or group of private insurers are numerous. Specialised and "politically immune" private 
firms would be responsible for assessing the financial condition of insured institutions. Since 
these firms would be putting their own capital at risk, they would have every incentive to 
collect and analyse the relevant market value information in order to set appropriate risk-
based capital standards, risk-based premiums, and, in the event of market value insolvencies, 
make recommendation for immediate closure. The government deposit insurer (and its 
insurance fund) would benefit from enhanced market discipline and the unbiased 
underwriting judgement of an independent professional. Taxpayers would receive 
considerably more protection from policies of forbearance, since private insurers would have 
a substantial interest in limiting the discretion of regulators in dealing with insolvent 
institutions. Either of two essentially similar proposals could be adopted in order to 
introduce a private insurer or group of insurers into the market for deposit insurance - the 
coinsurance proposal, or the reinsurance proposal. 
~ Coinsurance 
Coinsurance would require the private insurer to take the responsibility for a fixed proportion 
(10 percent, for example) of any losses suffered by insured depositors as a result of the 
failure of a financial institution. The balance of such losses (90 percent, in this case) would 
be met by the government deposit insurer. Thus, the private insurer has a clear, monetary 
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incentive to ensure that these losses are kept to a minimum. 
4.3,2 Reinsurance 
The difference between a policy of coinsurance and one of reinsurance is subtle, but 
significant. Under reinsurance, the government deposit insurer reinsures some specified 
monetary amount with the private insurer. Only if the losses suffered by insured depositors 
are in excess of this amount will the liability of the government insurer be invoked. Exactly 
how this will affect the liability of the private insurer as compared to the coinsurance option 
depends on the size of the insured loss, the specified amount reinsured, and the coinsurance 
percentage. Generally, the liability of the private insurer will be greater under reinsurance 
when the insured loss is relatively small, but in the event of a large insured loss, the 
percentage insured under the coinsurance option may exceed the reinsurance liability. In 
fact, the policies of reinsurance and coinsurance could be used in combination with one 
another, with the private insurer being fully liable for all losses up to some specified amount, 
and liable for some fixed proportion of any loss in excess of that amount. This would (at 
least partially) eliminate any disparity that might arise between the treatment by the private 
insurer of small institutions' and large institutions' insolvencies, under either the coinsurance 
or reinsurance option. 
When confronted with the benefits that arise from the introduction of a private deposit 
insurer, the logical progression is to question the necessity of any governmental involvement 
in the provision of deposit insurance. 
M THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
4.4.1 Arguments in Favour of Governmental Involvement 
The traditional argument for the involvement of government is that the private sector lacks 
the resources to support a credible system of private deposit insurance due to the magnitude 
of potential losses. The government, according to the proponents of governmental 
involvement in deposit insurance, has a natural advantage in its provision by virtue of the 
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ability to levy taxes. Yet these taxes are levied against the private sector. Thus, any 
argument that the private sector is incapable of supporting the potential losses arising from 
insured deposits, condemns any scheme of deposit insurance, not merely private ones (Dowd 
1989). 
In light of the incentive problems faced by government regulators, and the consequent 
policies of forbearance and TLTF, one can conclude that a governmental system of deposit 
insurance is likely to accumulate a larger liability than a private system, where such incentive 
problems are absent. Surely, therefore, if private agents, in their capacity as taxpayers, can 
support the larger insurance liabilities incurred by their government, they can, as insurers 
in their own right, support any smaller liabilities they might incur. 
Given that the "ability to levy taxes" is therefore largely irrelevant, the sole proviso for a 
private system of deposit insurance is that the private insurer have a credible means of 
pledging sufficient capital to cover the (smaller) claims to which it might be subjected. One 
such means, involving extensive use of the reinsurance principle, is discussed in the appendix 
to this chapter. 
There will always be those who argue that there is no substitute for the sovereign taxing 
power of government in providing security to insured depositors. However, in view of the 
significant reduction in the dangers posed by irrational bank runs that can be achieved 
through sound monetary policy, and in light of the appalling record of government in the 
provision of deposit insurance, the argument for governmental involvement appears very thin. 
4.4,2 Arguments Against Governmental Involvement 
Arguments against governmental involvement in the provision of deposit insurance are 
founded in two fundamental shortcomings of democratic governance, namely (i) the inability 
to discriminate; and (ii) the inability to respond to a changing environment. 
(i) The inability to discriminate 
"Insurance and democratic governance are fundamentally incompatible activities. In 
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order to be successful, insurers must be able to discriminate among insureds on an 
objective basis; democratic government, however, is premised on nondiscrimination 
and equal treatment for all. Therefore, effective insurance programs of any kind can 
operate successfully only in the private sector and without government subsidy." 
(Ely and Vanderhoff 1991a, p.19) 
If the market for deposit insurance was perfectly contestable, the entry and exit of potential 
insurers would dictate that institutions pay a fair market price for insurance, based on the 
insurers' informed estimates of their true risk. In the presence of a monopolistic government 
insurer, financial institutions have no opportunity to "comparison shop", with the result that 
the government insurer is able to produce and price its services inefficiently. 
Any attempt by the government to discriminate on the grounds of risk will be quickly 
opposed by those who believe they stand to lose from such discrimination. Similarly, any 
attempts to abandon policies that are no longer warranted will be met with resistance from 
those with vested interests. This is not to say that it is not possible for government to 
discriminate according to sound principles, but such discrimination is liable to be "too little, 
too late", with the result that deposit insurance will always be priced in such a way as to 
cross-subsidise the risk-takers at the expense of more prudent institutions, thus putting a 
premium on risk-taking behaviour. 
(ii) 1he inability to respond to a changing environment 
"President Clinton will need to revive the banking system to get the economy moving. 
The U.S. banking industry is being suffocated by an overwhelming regulatory 
burden." 
William M. Isaac - former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(Isaac 1993) 
The financial services sector is in a state of flux. Rapid technological change is redefining 
the historic role of depository institutions of credit extension and management of the 
payments system. This change is apparent not only in information systems (including both 
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computers and telecommunications), but also in financial technology, particularly in the trend 
towards the securitisation process which is resulting in a greater standardisation of financial 
products. 
This technological change has a number of implications for the viability of efficient and 
effective regulation by government of the financial services sector. The economies of scale 
and of scope brought about by changing technologies, which is evident by the increase in 
concentration of banking in South Africa, is resulting in larger, more complex organisations 
which place ever-increasing demands on the regulatory process, particularly at the 
examination and monitoring levels. In addition, as financial institutions offer a wider variety 
of services which they can selectively pursue according to their organisational objectives and 
the prevailing market conditions, the homogeneity upon which all forms of regulation are 
implicitly based, is destroyed. While this flexibility allows financial institutions to provide 
an allocatively and technically more efficient service, again the result is increased pressure 
on regulators to monitor the diverse activities of each and every regulatee. The increasing 
international flow of transactions further complicates the regulatory process. 
Thus, the extent and complexity of the rules required to define permissable and prohibited 
activities and to cope with possible linkages between the permissable and the prohibited is 
growing almost exponentially with the complexity of the financial services sector. 
Consequently, the task of government regulators is becoming increasingly burdensome, and, 
more significantly, the potential for unintended and undesirable distortions arising from 
misguided regulation increases all the time. An additional impediment is provided by the 
democratic requirement that consensus of some sort must be reached in order to adapt 
regulatory rules to changing conditions. This governmental inertia further increases the 
danger of regulatory failure. 
Clearly, advances in technology are rapidly invalidating the traditional regulatory 
philosophies according to which regulators should "micro-manage" or control in some detail, 
those activities which may or may not be conducted by financial institutions, and, in the 
event of noncompliance, should be the principal source of sanction (Ely 1988). More and 
more, inappropriate regulation will result in a stifling of innovation in the provision of 
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financial services and the increased economic burdens of an inefficient financial sector. 
The solution to controlling behaviour in an environment of ongoing change and increasing 
diversity is not the adoption of progressively more complicated rules, but rather to rely on 
a mechanism that is sufficiently flexible to adapt quickly to technological change, and has the 
versatility to ·cope with increasing diversity. The mechanism in question is, of course, the 
market mechanism. The regulatory tool generated by such a mechanism is a complete set 
of prices, each one specific to a unique set of circumstances and capable of rapid change in 
response to a change in those circumstances. Such a mechanism, however, can only operate 
in private, competitive markets, effectively precluding the possibility of direct governmental 
involvement in the regulation of the financial sector. 
~ SUMMARY - SIX ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
REFORM 
In view of the analysis presented in this chapter, one may conclude that a comprehensive 
reform of the policy of deposit insurance should incorporate the following essential features 
to the greatest extent possible: 
ONE: Risk-based deposit insurance premiums and risk-based capital standards set in private, 
competitive markets using market value information. 
TWO: An end to all risk exposure for taxpayers, with deposit insurance provided by private 
insurers making a credible pledge of sufficient capital to cover any claim to which they might 
be subjected. The principle of reinsurance might be used to generate an adequate capital 
base. 
THREE: The transfer of all monitoring and supervisory activities to the private insurers, 
resulting in the strict enforcement of capital standards, insurance premiums and insurance 
limits, where applicable. 
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FOUR: The abandonment of TL TF. Financial institutions should not be granted any more 
protection from failure or competition than other unregulated non-financial firms. This 
would be achieved by transfering the closure decision to the private insurers. 
FIVE: The presence of an effective lender of last resort in order to provide liquidity in 
times of need, thus eliminating the danger of financial panics. The lender of last resort 
(usually the central bank), would be insured by the private insurer against any default arising 
from insolvent, as opposed to illiquid, institutions. This would further insulate taxpayers 
from insolvency losses. 
SIX: Regulation by government to facilitate the implementation of the above-mentioned 
reforms, and the abandonment of regulatory attempts to substitute for them. 
The most comprehensive model of deposit insurance reform, and one which embraces all of 
the features discussed, has been developed by Bert Ely1, a financial institutions consultant 
from Alexandria, Virginia, under the patronage of Congressman Thomas Petri, a Republican 
from Wisconsin. A brief exposition of this model, essentially an industry self-insurance 
mechanism for financial institutions, appears in the appendix to this chapter. 
1Bert Ely has specialised in deposit insurance and banking structure issues since 1981, and has emerged 
as the nation's most quoted authority on the Savings and Loan crisis. 
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APPENDIX: 
A MODEL OF PRIVATE 
SELF-INSURANCE FOR 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
A.1 AN IDSTORICAL PRECEDENT 
The concept of private self-insurance for financial institutions is not new. Before the advent 
of the Federal Reserve, the nineteenth century American commercial bank clearinghouses, 
which had originally arisen to economise on the transactions costs involved in clearing 
cheques, provided an informal system of deposit insurance to depositors at member banks. 
Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990) describe how, in times of financial panic, these clearinghouses 
arranged suspensions of deposit convertibility and issued loan certificates to member banks 
to be used in the clearing process in place of true coinage. Effectively, through this 
mechanism, the resources of all member banks were pooled in order to insure the safety of 
the deposit liabilities of each and every member institution. Since the insolvency of any 
member bank carried with it potential losses for all members, these members had a clear 
incentive to monitor the financial condition of fellow members and strictly regulate 
admissions to the clearinghouse. Admission to the New York clearinghouse, for example, 
required banks to meet a certain capital standard, and to submit to periodic examinations by 
member institutions (Dotsey and Kuprianov 1990). Failure to meet these standards resulted 
in exclusion, whilst failure to maintain such standards often lead to expulsion. 
Expulsion from, or non-admission to, the clearinghouse mechanism substantially increased 
the transactions costs associated with clearing cheques, and therefore provided substantial 
incentives for banks to maintain a sound financial condition. In addition, the exclusion of 
a particular bank sent an unequivocal message to the market as to the creditworthiness of that 
institution. In this way, the superiority of financial institutions in monitoring the financial 
status of their fellow institutions (arising from specialist knowledge and lower costs of 
gathering information), was used to generate a credible source of market information. 
A, 2 A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF MARKET FORCES 
Perhaps the most notable feature of this self-regulatory system is that it arose voluntarily, 
motivated purely by the self-interest of the institutions concerned. In all organised markets, 
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traders have a clear interest in the establishment of a self-regulatory system to protect 
themselves and their clients. Securities, futures and commodities exchange markets have all 
evolved standards and codes of conduct to be adhered to, with transgressors facing the threat 
of expulsion from the market. 
It is unfortunate that the evolution of private deposit insurance mechanisms for financial 
institutions in the United States was effectively terminated by the formation of the Federal 
Reserve and the subsequent implementation of a government-regulated system of deposit 
insurance. These moves towards greater government control over the financial sector were 
a response to the macroeconomic instability at that time, widely believed to be the result of 
the concurrent financial panics and bank failures. Not only do Tussing (1967) and more 
recently Kaufman (1990) strongly dispute the responsibility of financial panics for the 
macroeconomic instability of that period, but Kaufman also provides a convincing argument 
that the degree of financial instability was more the fault of inadequate monetary policy 
(essentially the absence of an effective lender of last resort), than the result of any 
shortcomings in the system of self-insurance being employed by financial institutions. It is 
quite possible, therefore, that if the federal government had committed itself exclusively to 
fulfilling the role of lender of last resort, a system of private self-insurance by financial 
institutions would have been the natural evolution of market forces. 
AJ THE ELY-PETRI MODEL OF SELF-INSURANCE FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS1 
A model of fully-privatised self-insurance for financial institutions certainly sounds like a 
radical reform of the system of deposit insurance implemented by the FDIC and (now 
defunct) FSLIC, and it is. Yet under that system, financial institutions do, in fact, already 
insure themselves. Premiums are pooled, and the proceeds are dedicated to fulfilling 
individual institutions' promises to their depositors. However, it is civil servants, and not 
the contributors themselves, who are responsible for setting premiums and monitoring the 
behaviour of financial institutions. And as has already been noted, in the absence of a 
1The model was incorporated in a bill before Congress last year, the Taxpayer Protection and Deposit 
Insurance Reform Act of 1992. 
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marketplace to discipline this function, government regulators are highly unlikely to make 
economically rational decisions. 
This is the motivation behind the Ely-Petri model. It proposes a shift of the administration 
of the self-insurance mechanism to a competitive marketplace where sound, actuarially-based 
insurance principles can be used, principles that the political process could never be expected 
to adopt. The earning power and capital resources of the entire banking system (if 
necessary) would be utilised to protect all deposit balances in all commercial banks and 
savings and loan institutions against any loss whatsoever. Research reveals that the equity 
capital alone of commercial banks would have been sufficient to have absorbed all depositor 
losses during the Great Depression, the worst era in American banking history, and still left 
the banking system well capitalised. This can be seen in Table A-1 (below). 
TABLE A-1 
The Impact of Depositor ~ on Bank Equity Capital, 1929-1936 
(in $ milliom) 
Year Reported Depositor Capital~ Reduced Decline in 
Bank Equity ~ Cwnulative Capital as Capital as 
Capital Depositor a% of Bank a% of Bank 
(June 30) ~ ~ts Equity 
1929 $ 8,780 $ 85 $ 8,695 13,9% NIA 
1930 9,318 265 8,969 14,1% NIA 
1931 8,746 445 7,952 13,7% -6% 
1932 7,484 190 6,500 14,3% -20% 
1933 6,190 650 4,556 11,7% -34% 
1934 6,625 71 4,984 11,5% -29% 
1935 6,601 61 4,957 10,5% -29% 
1936 6,703 31 5,056 9,4% -28% 
1 FDIC losses plus ~timated losses to uninsured depositors. 
Source: Ely (1991b) 
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A..tJ.4 The 100% Cros.§-guarantee Concept 
Under the cross-guarantee concept, each financial institution would obtain its own cross-
guarantee contract issued by an ad hoc syndicate of guarantors, consisting of other financial 
institutions (and possibly even other organisations such as insurance companies and pension 
funds). This contract would insure all of the institution's deposits from any loss of principal, 
interest or liquidity, in any circumstance. While the model specifies the insurance of all 
deposit liabilities (and the possible insurance of other liabilities as well), a modification could 
easily be made to cap the level of insurance. Each and every guarantor would be required 
to obtain its own cross-guarantee contract, insuring not only its own deposit liabilities, but 
also its obligations as a guarantor. 
These cross-guarantee contracts would replace the uniform regulation of financial institutions 
by government regulators, permitting the marketplace to determine premiums and other 
contractual terms and restrictions according to the individual needs and capabilities of each 
institution. Petri and Ely (1992) envision monthly insurance premiums based on leading 
indicators of banking risk designed to deter unsound banking practices. 
Based on two features of cross-guarantees, they predict that financial institution insolvencies 
would become rare events and losses to guarantors would be minimal. Firstly, if an 
institution began to engage in unsound practices, risk-sensitive premiums based on leading 
indicators of risk would begin to rise, rapidly depressing the earnings and consequently the 
stock price of the firm. This fall in stock price would trigger equity market intervention in 
the form of management changes and/or recapitalisation, restoring the stability of the 
institution and lowering the insurance premiums. In the absence of such intervention, a 
continuation of the slide towards insolvency would enable the guarantors to take over the 
institution before it became market-value insolvent. A takeover point would be negotiated .. 
by each institution and its syndicate of guarantors, and specified in the cross-guarantee 
contract. Where guarantors do not take over a failing institution in time, they will reimburse 
depositors for any loss suffered. 
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In the (unlikely) event of a large loss or a concentration of losses, various measures exist to 
prevent any institution from being driven into insolvency as a result of losses incurred in its 
capacity as guarantor. The key safeguard is a mandatory "stop-loss" requirement (essentially 
a form of reinsurance) common to all cross-guarantee contracts. According to this stop-loss 
requirement, any guarantor whose cross-guarantee losses exceed five times the total of all 
cross-guarantee premiums collected over the previous twelve months may pass the excess 
through to its own guarantors. Effectively, the stop-loss feature captures the earning power 
and the equity capital of the entire banking system in constructing a "solvency safety net" 
that, by spreading insolvency losses widely and thinly, equips the banking system to survive 
calamities of the magnitude of the Great Depression (Ely 1991b). 
The proposed Taxpayer Protection and Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 1992 includes three 
additional risk-dispersion requirements. Each cross-guarantee contract must have a minimum 
number of guarantors, each of whom may assume no more than a limited amount of the risk. 
This limit is based upon the capital of each guarantor, as is the limit on the total amount of 
cross-guarantee risk that any institution is permitted to assume. In addition, small groups 
of institutions may not cross-guarantee each other in an undiversified manner due to the 
danger of a chain-reaction in such a closed-loop situation. Finally, although no specific 
capital requirements exist for individual banks, the banking system as a whole is required to 
satisfy a minimum equity standard. 
~ The Proposed Benefits of 100% Cross-guarantees 
The Ely-Petri model, as mentioned in conclusion to the previous chapter, incorporates many 
of the features essential to the meaningful reform of deposit insurance. 
The stop-loss feature, and consequent creation of a fully-privatised solvency safety net would 
put an end to the risk of loss to taxpayers associated with a government-managed deposit 
insurance fund. Any losses incurred by the government in its capacity as lender of last resort 
would also be fully insured by the relevant cross-guarantee contract. 
Actuarially sound risk-sensitive premiums determined in a competitive marketplace would 
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largely eliminate the cross-subsidies present in flat-rate deposit insurance premiums, reducing 
the problem of moral hazard and encouraging a more productive use of credit. 
Allocative and technical efficiency gains would be further enhanced by the privatisation of 
the closure decision. Expedient takeovers of failing institutions, before insolvency, would 
rid the financial sector of, to use Edward Kane's analogy (Kane 1989), "zombie institutions", 
which, through excessively risky behaviour, high borrowing rates, and low lending rates, 
force previously healthy competitors into insolvency and similar behaviour. The benefits of 
these efficiency gains would be enjoyed not only in the financial sector, but also by the 
economy as a whole. 
Another consequence of a private sector closure decision would be the abandonment of the 
regulatory practice of TLTF and its inherent cross-subsidy at the expense of smaller 
institutions. The threat of personal loss would provide the incentive for cross-guarantors to 
close all insolvent institutions, both large and small. 
In an environment of rapid technological change, 100 % cross-guarantees would enable 
financial institutions to escape the one-size-must-fit-all mentality of government regulation. 
Individual institutions would enjoy the flexibility of negotiating a cross-guarantee contract 
that would allow them to innovate at their own pace and tailor their capital structure 
according to their own particular lending and investment strategy. The result would be a 
more dynamic financial sector, better equipped to meet the specialised banking needs and 
evolving demands of an environment in a state of flux. 
Probably the greatest benefit arising from the implementation of the system of 100% cross-
guarantees would be the depoliticisation of the financial services sector. Financial institutions 
would no longer be able to obtain political salvation from adverse market conditions. This 
would enable the relevant authorities to concentrate solely on creating an environment that 
would facilitate the efficient operation of the cross-guarantee mechanism. 
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A.3.3 The Question of Antitrust 
Much of the criticism levelled against the cross-guarantee concept is centred around the 
concern that cross-guarantee syndicates would foster anti-competitive behaviour among 
financial institutions. According to Petri and Ely (1992), these concerns are unfounded. 
Petri's proposed Act requires each cross-guarantee syndicate to retain an independent firm, 
the so-called "syndicate agent", to monitor the financial condition of the guaranteed 
institution on its behalf. The independence of the syndicate agent would enable 
confidentiality to be maintained between the guaranteed institution and its guarantors, some 
of whom may also be competitors. The syndicate agent would, however, be bound by an 
unambiguous fiduciary obligation to the guarantors to apprise them of the overall financial 
condition of the institution. Furthermore, the Act authorises non-banking firms to participate 
as guarantors, thus broadening the spectrum of potential guarantors from which institutions 
may choose. Competition amongst cross-guarantee syndicates would protect institutions from 




This paper has attempted to highlight the dangers inherent in state-sponsored deposit 
insurance schemes and, more generally, governmental policies of investor protection. It is 
argued that governmental involvement, in direct conflict with its intended goals, may, in fact, 
result in increased instability in the provision of financial services. 
The ability of government to create significant distortions in the name of investor protection 
does not, however, necessarily condemn all forms of collective action. According to Davis 
(1987), efficient, well-defined rules of conduct and property rights, that create competitive 
market structures and generate a choice of products, price and information, clearly have 
public-good aspects and consequently may provide justification for some degree of collective 
provision. Legislation regarding auditing and accounting procedures, as well as sanctions 
against those guilty of theft or fraudulent misrepresentation, may be employed in order to 
create a competitive market environment in which buyers and sellers of financial services 
may transact freely, unencumbered by restrictive regulation. Of paramount importance to 
all transactions, is that buyers be made aware that any rate of return in excess of the risk-free 
rate carries with it some degree of risk. 
In such a competitive environment, financial institutions have a clear self-interest in 
providing the optimum risk-return combination to investors. Certain risk-averse and/or 
unsophisticated investors may, however, be reticent to expose themselves to the threat of 
material losses. Institutions have the choice of responding by offering a guarantee of 
protection, or of relinquishing a market opportunity which may be exploited by their 
competitors. Thus, privately-administered deposit insurance schemes may, or may not, arise 
as a natural evolution of market forces. 
There is currently no official policy statement with regard to deposit insurance in South 
Africa. Large financial institutions are, however, implicitly guaranteed by the South African 
Reserve Bank in its function as lender of last resort. The possibility of increased competition 
in the provision of financial services, as well as the prospective creation of a mutual banking 
industry, may result in a demand for the formalisation of governmental policy concerning 
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deposit insurance. If this is indeed the case, the conclusions arrived at in this paper will be 
of significant relevance. 
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